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1981 
PROTECTING THE PRIVACIES OF DIGITAL 
LIFE: RILEY V. CALIFORNIA, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT’S PARTICULARITY 
REQUIREMENT, AND SEARCH PROTOCOLS 
FOR CELL PHONE SEARCH WARRANTS 
Abstract: In 2014, in Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
police must obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone. Since then, lower 
courts have struggled to determine what scope limitations judges should place on 
cell phone warrants in order to ensure that these warrants do not devolve into un-
constitutional general searches. This Note argues that the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement mandates that the government submit search protocols, 
technical documents that explain the search methods the government will use on 
the seized device, for cell phone search warrants. This argument is based on the 
Riley decision, as well as a series of decisions from two magistrate judges that 
have required search protocols for cell phone search warrants. Detailed search 
protocols will ensure that cell phone search warrants have a particularized scope 
and thereby protect the privacies of life modern cell phones contain. 
INTRODUCTION 
As of January 2014, ninety percent of American adults own a cell phone.1 
In 2013, Americans used their cell phones to send 1.9 trillion text messages, 
talk for 2.6 trillion minutes, and view 3.2 trillion megabytes worth of data from 
the Internet.2 Today, the most popular types of cell phones are smartphones, 
handheld computers capable of storing massive amounts of information.3 Most 
smartphone users rely on their devices for a wide range of daily activities.4 For 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Mobile Device Ownership Over Time, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/data-
trend/mobile/device-ownership/ [http://perma.cc/SWN4-372D] [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR]; see 
also Riley v. California (Riley II), 134 S. Ct 2473, 2490 (2014) (noting the prevalence of cell phones 
in the United States). 
 2 See CELLULAR TELECOMM. INDUS. ASS’N, WIRELESS INDUSTRY SUMMARY REPORT, YEAR-
END 2013 RESULTS 8 (2014), http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/Facts-Stats/ctia_survey_ye_
2013_graphics-final.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [http://perma.cc/SWN4-372D]. 
 3 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct at 2489 (describing smartphones as “minicomputers that also happen to 
have the capacity to be used as a telephone”); PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 1 (stating that 58% of 
American adults own a smartphone). 
 4 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct at 2484, 2489 (stating that modern cell phones “are now such a pervasive 
and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an im-
portant feature of human anatomy” and observing that these devices “could just as easily be called 
cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, 
maps, or newspapers”); How Smartphones Are Changing Consumers’ Daily Routines Around the Globe, 
1982 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1981 
seventy-nine percent of smartphone users, the first thing they do when they 
wake up is check their phones.5 
With the rising popularity of smartphones, many Americans are placing 
more and more sensitive and personal information on their mobile devices.6 
Smartphone users can not only make phone calls, write emails, and send text 
messages, but they can also keep records of credit card and bank statements and 
input their symptoms for medical diagnoses all at the touch of their phone’s 
screen.7 As these advanced smartphone functions become more popular, many 
users are increasingly concerned about privacy and security on their devices. 8 
                                                                                                                           
NIELSON (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2014/how-smartphones-are-
changing-consumers-daily-routines-around-the-globe.html [http://perma.cc/MT76-HKYK] [hereinafter 
NIELSON]. Smartphones and other mobile devices have quickly become the most popular way for Ameri-
cans to access the Internet. See James O’Toole, Mobile Apps Overtake PC Internet Usage in U.S., 
CNN MONEY (Feb. 28, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/28/technology/mobile/
mobile-apps-internet/ [http:// perma.cc/8LLP-KU99] (noting how in January 2014, mobile devices 
accounted for 55% of Internet usage in the United States, with 47% of Internet usage occurring 
through applications (“apps”) on mobile devices and only 45% of Internet usage occurring through 
personal computers); Sarah Perez, Majority of Digital Media Consumption Now Takes Place in Mo-
bile Apps, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 21, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/21/majority-of-digital-
media-consumption-now-takes-place-in-mobile-apps/ [http://perma.cc/45B3-ATVX] (observing that 
60% of time spent consuming digital media occurs on mobile devices, leaving 40% of time spent 
consuming digital media on personal computers). 
 5 See Allison Stadd, 79% of People 18–44 Have Their Smartphones with Them 22 Hours a Day, 
ADWEEK: SOCIAL TIMES (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/smartphones/
480485?red=at [http://perma.cc/SBN3-J8LR]. Seventy-nine percent of smartphone users carry their 
phone with them for all but two hours of the time they are awake. Id. 
 6 See CONSUMER & CMTY. DEV. RESEARCH SECTION, FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMERS AND 
MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 2014, at 1 (Mar. 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
consumers-and-mobile-financial-services-report-201403.pdf [http://perma.cc/ER59-EP8H] (noting 
how banking via mobile phones is becoming increasingly popular); Hacking Health: How Consumers 
Use Smartphones and Wearable Tech to Track Their Health, NIELSON (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2014/hacking-health-how-consumers-use-smartphones-
and-wearable-tech-to-track-their-health.html [http://perma.cc/NN4B-EDD9] (describing the growing 
popularity of health and fitness apps for smartphones); Keep Your Phone Safe: How to Protect Your-
self from Wireless Threats, CONSUMER REPORTS MAG. (June 2013), http://www.consumerreports.org/
privacy0613 [http://perma.cc/4C3U-WDEP] (listing examples of the private information many Amer-
icans store on their cell phones, including financial information and personal photographs). 
 7 See Bank of America Mobile Banking App on Your iPhone and iPad, BANK OF AM., https://
www.bankofamerica.com/online-banking/iphone-banking-app.go [http://perma.cc/T95T-SYME] (de-
scribing the features of Bank of America’s mobile apps for smartphones, including account transfers and 
remote deposits); NIELSON, supra note 4 (stating 11% of smartphone time is spent using text message or 
phone call capabilities); What We Make, HEALTHTAP, http://www.healthtap.com/what_we_make/over
view [http://perma.cc/S5ES-5J8W] (describing HealthTap, an application that allows users to communi-
cate directly with doctors through their smartphones twenty-four hours a day, including through text, 
voice, and video chat). 
 8 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (noting how American cell phone users “keep on their person a 
digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives”); Janice C. Sipior et al., Privacy Concerns Associated 
with Smartphone Use, 13 J. INTERNET COMM. 177, 178 (2014) (stating that the increasing popularity of 
smartphones leads to an increasing risk to user privacy); Smartphone Users Care More About Privacy 
Than Screen Size or Brand, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.infosecurity-magazine
2015] Mandatory Search Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants 1983 
Accordingly, most smartphone users want protections to ensure that their sensi-
tive and personal information will remain private and secure.9 
Recognizing the important role that cell phones play in the lives of many 
Americans, in 2014, in Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the police could not search a cell phone incident to an arrest without first ob-
taining a warrant.10 A unanimous Court recognized that to allow the govern-
ment unfettered access to the deeply sensitive information cell phones often 
contain would authorize the type of broad and intrusive searches against which 
the Fourth Amendment protects.11 Privacy advocates championed the decision 
as a reaffirmation of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the digi-
tal age.12 
In the aftermath of Riley, however, lower courts have articulated different 
standards for the scope of cell phone search warrants.13 A few courts have re-
                                                                                                                           
.com/news/smartphone-users-care-more-about-privacy-than/ [http://perma.cc/4Z7H-L7Q9] [hereinafter 
INFOSECURITY MAG.] (noting how privacy is second only to battery life as smartphone users’ most 
pressing concerns when considering using mobile applications). But see Winston Ross, How Much Is 
Your Privacy Worth?, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/
529686/how-much-is-your-privacy-worth/ [http://perma.cc/N899-9FG6] (discussing new companies that 
are paying smartphone users a monthly fee for access to the users’ web browsing and banking data). In 
2014, Americans used smartphone applications 76% more than they did in 2013. See Simon Khalaf, 
Shopping, Productivity and Messaging Give Mobile Another Stunning Growth Year, FLURRY (Jan. 6, 
2015), http://www.flurry.com/blog/flurry-insights/shopping-productivity-and-messaging-give-mobile-
another-stunning-growth-year# [http://perma.cc/5KNC-Y668]. They used shopping apps 174% more, 
messaging apps 103% more, and health apps 89% more than in 2013. Id. 
 9 See Sipior et al., supra note 8, at 178 (noting how many smartphone users believe privacy on 
their devices is an important issue and that they would like more control over their private infor-
mation); INFOSECURITY MAG., supra note 8 (stating that consumers are becoming increasingly con-
cerned with privacy on their mobile devices). 
 10 Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. 
 11 Id. at 2494–95. 
 12 See, e.g., Andrew Pincus, Evolving Technology and the Fourth Amendment: The Implications of 
Riley v. California, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 336 (asserting the importance of Riley in charting a 
new course for Fourth Amendment protections in the digital age); Emily Phelps, In Riley, a Decision 
Worth Celebrating—Just in Time for Independence Day, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (June 27, 
2014), http://theusconstitution.org/text-history/2749/riley-decision-worth-celebrating—just-time-indep
endence-day [http://perma.cc/7ART-Y4R7] (discussing the Court’s recognition of the parallels be-
tween writs of assistance and warrantless cell phone searches); Richard Re, Symposium: Inaugurating 
the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourth-amendment/ [http://perma.cc/PB2R-UV
M9]; Jay Stanley, How the Supreme Court Could Have Ruled in Riley, AM. C.L. UNION (June 26 
2014, 11:17 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-criminal-law-reform/how-
supreme-court-could-have-ruled-riley [https://perma.cc/HP7E-3LVV] (noting how privacy scholars 
have celebrated the Riley decision). 
 13 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, at *9 (D. Kan. June 
26, 2014) (relying on Riley to hold a warrant for a cell phone search without a search protocol violates 
the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement); Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.3d 119, 
130 (Ky. 2014) (interpreting Riley as placing no new particularity limitations on cell phone search 
warrants); State v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 616, 633–34 (Neb. 2014) (stating that, in the wake of 
Riley, courts will have to determine how detailed warrants for cell phones must be); John Wesley Hall, 
1984 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1981 
fused to issue cell phone search warrants unless the government submitted 
search protocols, technical documents that explain the exact methods the po-
lice will use to limit the scope of their search.14 Other courts have discussed 
the potential need for search protocols, but have yet to mandate them for cell 
phone search warrants.15 Finally, at least one court has upheld broad warrants 
that allow the government to review the entire contents of cell phones, later 
inferring scope limitations into the warrants when challenged by defendants.16 
This Note argues that judges must require detailed search protocols for 
cell phone search warrants in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement.17 As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Riley, to allow 
the police unguided review of the entire contents of a cell phone when execut-
ing a search warrant would authorize the exact type of general warrants that 
the Fourth Amendment forbids.18 Some earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases have 
interpreted the particularity requirement to place no limitations on how the 
police execute warrants.19 In Riley, however, the Court recognized that the 
fundamental differences between physical and digital searches may require 
courts to articulate new rules and new interpretations of the Fourth Amend-
ment.20 
Part I of this Note discusses the principles of the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement, how those principles have been applied to computer 
                                                                                                                           
D.Kan.: Standard Gov’t Cell Phone Search Protocol Violates Particularity Requirement and Results 
in a General Search, FOURTHAMENDMENT.COM (July 1, 2014), http://fourthamendment.com/?p=
12343 [http://perma.cc/9P7K-R2QY] (arguing that the particularity requirement will be a recurring 
issue in warrants for cell phone searches). 
 14 See, e.g., In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14; In re the Search of Apple iPhone, 
31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 166 (D.D.C. 2014); In re ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415 in 
Custody of U.S. Postal Inspection Serv., 1400 New York Ave. NW, Wash., D.C., 28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 46 
(D.D.C. 2014); In re the Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 15 See United States v. Lustyik, No. 13-CR-616-VB, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 29, 2014) (discussing the Riley decision and its possible impact on search protocols for cell 
phone search warrants); Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633–34 (recognizing the potential need for search 
protocols in cell phone search warrants, but deciding the case before it on other grounds). 
 16 See Hedgepath, 441 S.W.3d at 130. 
 17 See infra notes 158–221 and accompanying text. 
 18 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (requiring the police to get search 
warrants for cell phone searches in part because of the historical prohibition against general warrants); 
infra notes 32–46 and accompanying text (outlining the foundational principles of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
19 See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98 (2006) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement does not require the police to submit in warrant applications how they will 
execute the search warrant); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979) (holding that the police 
do not need prior authorization before covertly installing electronic listening devices because the po-
lice have discretion over how to execute a warrant). 
 20 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (recognizing the limits of applying rules of physical searches to 
digital searches); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1169 n.11 (Vt. 2012) (stating that earlier U.S. 
Supreme Court cases, such as Dalia, do not prevent judges from requiring search protocols for war-
rants for computer searches), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 185 (2013). 
2015] Mandatory Search Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants 1985 
searches, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California.21 Part II 
of this Note outlines the different approaches to cell phone warrants taken by 
lower courts, comparing courts that have required search protocols for cell 
phone search warrants with those that have not.22 Part III of this Note argues 
that courts should recognize the fundamental differences between physical and 
digital searches and require search protocols for cell phone search warrants.23 
Part III then provides four recommendations for requirements judges should 
place in cell phone search protocols.24 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PARTICULARIZED WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
AND ITS SURPRISING RESURGENCE IN RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
This Part outlines the Fourth Amendment’s particularized warrant re-
quirement and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. California, 
which applied the warrant requirement to cell phone searches.25 Section A re-
views the foundational principles of the Fourth Amendment.26 Then, section B 
discusses how courts have applied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity re-
quirement to computer searches.27 Finally, section C explains the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in Riley v. California, including the background of the 
decision and its broader implications for digital searches.28 
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Protections of the “Privacies of Life”  
This section discusses the principles of the Fourth Amendment.29 Subsec-
tion 1 outlines the foundational principles of the Fourth Amendment.30 Subsec-
tion 2 examines the Fourth Amendment’s protection against government intru-
sions into the “privacies of life” and searches of the home.31  
1. The Foundational Principles of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the right of the 
people against government intrusions into their private lives and spaces.32 The 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra notes 25–94 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 95–157 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 158–221 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 205–221 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 25–94 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 29–56 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 57–72 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 73–94 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 29–56 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 32–46 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
 32 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) 
1986 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1981 
amendment contains two separate clauses: the reasonableness clause and the 
warrant clause.33 The reasonableness clause requires that all government 
searches and seizures be reasonable.34 The warrant clause allows courts to is-
sue warrants only if two conditions are met: the warrant is supported by proba-
ble cause and it includes particularized descriptions of “the place to be 
searched” and “the people or things to be seized.”35 This second condition is 
known as the particularity requirement.36  
In order to comply with the particularity requirement, the warrant must 
contain two sets of precise descriptions.37 First, the warrant must describe the 
place to be searched with enough detail to allow the police to recognize the 
location with relative ease.38 Second, the warrant must describe the persons or 
                                                                                                                           
(holding the government’s physical intrusion onto private property for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation was a search under the Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) 
(stating the Fourth Amendment’s protections extend beyond physical intrusions onto property and 
protect people from secret government wiretapping); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961) (characterizing the core protection of the Fourth Amendment as “the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”). 
 33 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (stating that the 
Fourth Amendment’s text establishes two requirements); RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 420–21 (3d ed. 2011) (chronicling the U.S. Supreme Court’s shift towards 
reading the reasonableness requirement and warrant requirement separately). 
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (noting how the Fourth 
Amendment requires all searches and seizures to be reasonable); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
398, 403 (2006) (stating that “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”). 
 35 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); King, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1856 (stating the Fourth Amendment requires the government to establish probable cause and set 
out the scope of the search with particularity in order for a court to issue a warrant); Groh v. Ramirez, 
540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (holding a warrant that failed to particularly describe the items to be seized 
violated the Fourth Amendment); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983) (characterizing a neutral 
judge’s determination that probable cause has been established as “the essential protection of the war-
rant requirement”). Probable cause is a malleable concept, requiring a magistrate to weigh the totality 
of the information presented in the application and decide if there is a fair probability that the search 
will expose particular evidence of a crime. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996) 
(stating that it is impossible to provide a precise articulation of the meaning of probable cause); Gates, 
462 U.S. at 232 (describing how probable cause “turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particu-
lar factual contexts” and how it is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules”). 
 36 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Groh, 540 U.S. at 557 (holding the warrant itself, and not the 
warrant application, must provide a particularized description of the things to be seized); Maryland v. 
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (stating the warrant’s description must be proportionally detailed to 
the amount of information available to the police at the time they submit the warrant). 
37 See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97 (stating that the Fourth Amendment requires two particularized de-
scriptions); Groh, 540 U.S. at 557 (noting how the Fourth Amendment requires warrants to contain 
detailed descriptions of both the place the government will search and the items the government wish-
es to seize); ALLEN, supra note 33, at 426. 
 38 See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88–89 (holding the police made “reasonable effort to ascertain and 
identify” the place to be searched); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (stating that the 
description should allow the police officer executing the warrant to find the place to be searched); 
ALLEN, supra note 33, at 425. 
2015] Mandatory Search Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants 1987 
things to be seized in order to limit where the police can look and for how long 
they can look.39 These dual demands of particularity ensure that the police es-
tablish the proper location for their search and have clear objectives in mind 
during their search.40 
The particularity requirement does not, however, mandate that the police 
include descriptions of how they plan to execute their warrants.41 The U.S. Su-
preme Court rejected such a requirement in 1979, in Dalia v. United States.42 
In Dalia, the Court held the police did not violate the particularity requirement 
when they covertly entered the defendant’s office to install a recording de-
vice.43 The police had a warrant to install the device, but they did not have pri-
or authorization for their covert entry into the defendant’s office.44 The Court 
held that the police have the discretion to determine how to execute warrants 
and that the particularity requirement places no limits on this discretion.45 But, 
the Court noted that, as a policy matter, prior authorization for covert entry was 
the “preferable approach” because such entry was an additional intrusion upon 
the defendant’s privacy rights.46 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (stating the particularity requirement limits the scope of the gov-
ernment’s search); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (stating that particularized de-
scriptions of the things to be seized prevent the police from seizing items beyond the scope of the 
warrant); ALLEN, supra note 33, at 426 (describing how the particularity requirement limits searches 
both spatially and temporally); THOMAS MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 66 
(2009) (discussing how requiring particularized descriptions of the items to be seized prevents “fish-
ing expeditions” by the police). 
 40 See Groh, 540 U.S. at 554–55, 557 (holding that a warrant failed to meet the particularity re-
quirement because it did not identify any of the items intended to be seized); Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 
(discussing how the probable cause and particularity requirements work together to limit the scope of 
government searches); Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1967) (invalidating New 
York’s wiretap statute because it allowed warrants for wiretaps to be issued without specifying the 
particular crime being investigated); ALLEN, supra note 33, at 426 (discussing how the particularity 
requirement limits both the areas the police can search and how long the police may search an area). 
 41 See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257; Orin Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1241, 1266 (2010) (interpreting Dalia as rejecting the view that the particularity require-
ment commands preapproval of how warrants will be executed); Stephen Guzzi, Note, Digital 
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Interplay Between the Plain View Doctrine and Search–
Protocol Warrant Restrictions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 301, 310 (2012) (discussing how after Dalia the 
police determine the manner in which warrants are executed, with the only limitation on police discre-
tion being the reasonableness requirement). 
42 Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See id. at 245 (describing how FBI agents secretly entered the defendant’s office at midnight 
and spent three hours installing recording devices in his ceiling). 
 45 See id. at 257. 
 46 See id. at 257, 259 n.22 (accepting that by covertly entering the office, the police impinged on 
privacy interests “not explicitly considered by the judge who issued the warrant” and discussing how 
the Department of Justice’s policy was to seek prior authorization for covert entries to install listening 
devices); see also Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital: Fourth Amendment Particularity 
and Stored E-mail Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 1015 (2012) (reading Dalia to encourage limi-
tations on the execution of warrants); Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the 
1988 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1981 
2. Home Searches and the “Privacies of Life” 
A person’s home receives the highest level of protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.47 Although deriving in part from traditional property rights, the 
Fourth Amendment’s steadfast protection of the home is primarily founded on 
the belief that the home is the most private of places.48 In 1887, in Boyd v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, in an often-quoted line, that 
the Fourth Amendment protects the sanctity of a person’s home and the “priva-
cies of life” therein contained.49 The “privacies of life” are the intimate and 
private details of a person’s day: from family budgets, to conversations with a 
partner, to love letters, to evening prayers.50 Because the home has traditionally 
has been the vault for this private property and the scene for these private mo-
                                                                                                                           
Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 3–4 (2011) http://www.virginialawreview.
org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/ohm.pdf [http://perma.cc/C6LE-MFNY] (interpreting Dalia to 
endorse ex ante restrictions on searches). In 2006, in United States v. Grubbs, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed this narrow interpretation of the particularity requirement, stating again that it does not 
command the police to explain how they plan to execute warrants. Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 98; see Friess, 
supra, at 1003–04 (reading Grubbs to once again reject attempts to expand the particularity require-
ment’s meaning); Kerr, supra note 41, at 1268 (characterizing Grubbs as reading the particularity 
requirement narrowly). The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment provides no general requirement of 
particularity and that courts should be skeptical of efforts expand the particularity clause’s meaning. See 
Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97; Friess, supra, at 1003–04 (recognizing Grubbs’ rejection of a generalized 
particularity requirement); Kerr, supra note 41, at 1268 (reading Grubbs to preclude attempts to ex-
pand the meaning of the particularity requirement). 
 47 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (stating “the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a 
firm line at the entrance to the house’” and requiring a warrant for a thermal scan of the area above a 
house (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 (stating 
“[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”); Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: 
Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912 (2010) (describing 
how judges provide the highest protection under the Fourth Amendment to homes). 
 48 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (holding that the government’s use of 
drug sniffing dogs to investigate defendant’s home was a search under Fourth Amendment because of 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection of a homeowner’s property rights); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (requir-
ing a warrant for a thermal scan above a house because the Fourth Amendment provides special pro-
tection to homes); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (characterizing the home as 
“the most private of places”). 
 49 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see, e.g., Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 
(quoting Boyd to support requiring a warrant to search cell phones); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S 
573, 585 (1980) (quoting Boyd to support requiring a warrant to arrest a suspect in his home); Berger, 
388 U.S. at 58 (quoting Boyd and holding that New York’s wiretap statute violated the particularity 
requirement); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (quoting Boyd to support a general 
right of privacy). 
 50 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2490, 2494–95 (stating that cell phones contain the modern “priva-
cies of life” and discussing mobile applications for family budgets, prayers, and dating); Berger, 388 
U.S. at 58–59 (expressing concern that a wiretap would seize private conversations outside scope of 
government investigation and thereby invade the “privacies of life”); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; see also 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 (stating that the government’s use of a heat sensor around a house could expose 
intimate details such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and 
bath”). 
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ments, the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before 
almost all home searches.51 
Invoking the home’s special status, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
facially broad search warrants for homes violate the particularity require-
ment.52 In 2004, in Groh v. Ramirez, the U.S. Supreme Court held a search 
warrant for a home was invalid because it failed to include a particularized 
description of the evidence sought.53 The warrant’s application included a de-
tailed description of weapons the government wished to seize from the home, 
but the warrant itself failed to incorporate this description.54 Citing the height-
ened privacy protections given to the home, the Court refused to find that the 
application’s detailed descriptions cured the warrant’s facially unlimited 
scope.55 Instead, the Court considered the warrant so overly broad that, for all 
intents and purposes, the search was warrantless and therefore violated the 
Fourth Amendment.56 
B. Particularity in Computer Searches and Search Protocols 
Over the past twenty-five years, lower courts have grappled with how to 
apply the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement to warrants authoriz-
ing the search of computers.57 Most circuit courts have imported the funda-
                                                                                                                           
 51 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (holding that although warrantless searches of homes are pre-
sumed unreasonable, that presumption can be overcome through exigent circumstances); Groh, 540 
U.S. at 559 (stating “our cases have firmly established the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law 
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable”(citation 
omitted)); Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. 
 52 See Groh, 540 U.S. at 559, 563 (discussing the special protections homes receive and holding a 
search warrant for a home violated the particularity requirement); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S 476, 486 
(1965) (holding a warrant authorizing the search of a home for literary material violated the particular-
ity requirement). 
 53 Groh, 540 U.S. at 557. 
 54 Id. Where the police were supposed to incorporate the detailed list of the weapons sought, they 
mistakenly provided a description of the defendant’s house. Id. at 554. The warrant therefore confus-
ingly read: “[T]here is now concealed [on the specified premises] certain person or property, namely 
[a] single dwelling residence two story in height which is blue in color and has two additions attached 
to the east. The front entrance to the residence faces in a southerly direction.” Id. at 554 n.2.  
 55 See id. at 557, 559; Stern, supra note 47, at 913–14 (reading Groh as one of several U.S. Su-
preme Court cases “proclaim[ing] the sanctity of the home and its inviolability”). 
 56 Groh, 540 U.S. at 558. The Court found no exception to the warrant requirement applied, 
thereby making the search unreasonable. Id. at 561. 
 57 See United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding a warrant for the search of 
several laptops and USB storage drives that did not provide a description of the specific items for which 
the police searched violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement); United States v. Ric-
cardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862–63 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding a warrant for the search of a computer violated 
the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement because it failed to limit the search to evidence of 
specific crimes or specific materials); Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 124 (2011) (discussing how courts have translated Fourth 
Amendment principles to apply to digital searches over the past twenty years); Orin Kerr, Digital 
Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 280 (2005) (observing how 
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mental principles of the particularity requirement to computer searches, de-
manding warrants provide specific descriptions of the places to be searched 
and the evidence to be seized.58 Some judges, however, have placed stricter 
particularity limitations on computer searches, requiring police to submit sepa-
rate proposals in their warrant applications that describe the methods the gov-
ernment will use to find that data on the seized computers.59 These proposals 
are known as search protocols.60 
Judges who mandate search protocols do so to ensure that the govern-
ment’s search of the device does not violate the particularity requirement.61 
                                                                                                                           
some courts have begun to develop new Fourth Amendment interpretations for searches of comput-
ers); Kerr, supra note 41, at 1243–44 (noting how some magistrate judges have begun placing stricter 
limitations in warrants on searches of computers because of particularity concerns). In order to pro-
vide an overview of the existing framework for computer searches and the Fourth Amendment, this 
section focuses on computer searches rather than cell phone searches. See infra notes 57–72 and ac-
companying text. 
 58 See Rosa, 626 F.3d at 59, 62; Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 862–63; Friess, supra note 46, at 993–94 
(observing that courts consistently hold warrants in violation of the particularity requirement if the 
government fails to use available information to particularize its descriptions of the items to be 
seized); Goldfoot, supra note 57, at 136 (discussing how warrants calling for the search and seizure of 
all the data on a computer have routinely been found overbroad in violation of the particularity re-
quirement). 
 59 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (describing 
the search protocol the magistrate judge required before issuing a warrant); Kerr, supra note 41, at 
1255–56 (describing how judges have begun to use search protocols to limit warrants); see also Unit-
ed States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 538 (6th Cir. 2011) (observing that most federal courts do not 
require search protocols for search warrants for computers); United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (arguing that 
warrant applications for computer searches should include search protocols); In re Search Warrant, 71 
A.3d at 1170 (upholding a judge’s power to force police to submit search protocol along with applica-
tion for search warrant of computer). 
 60 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (stating how a search protocol 
describes “(a) the information the government sought to seize from the computer and (b) the methods 
the government planned to use to locate that information”); Susan W. Brenner, Requiring Protocols in 
Computer Search Warrants, 2 DIGITAL EVIDENCE 180, 182 (2005) (defining search protocols and 
noting how they derive from the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement). 
 61 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 961; In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 
at 1162 (discussing how the lower court required the search protocol for the computer search warrant 
in order to limit the search’s scope); Kerr, supra note 41, at 1255 (noting how some judges require 
search protocols in order to keep digital searches narrowly focused). These judges also require search 
protocols in order to address the knotty issue of the Fourth Amendment’s plain view doctrine and 
digital searches. See In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1162 (noting that the lower court judge explic-
itly prevented the government from relying on the plain view doctrine in order to seize evidence out-
side the warrant’s scope); Kerr, supra note 41, at 1255. The plain view doctrine allows the police to 
search and seize evidence they find in plain view during a search, even if such evidence falls outside 
the authorized scope of that initial search. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738–39 (1983) (noting 
how plain view doctrine allows police to seize “suspicious objects” immediately so long as their initial 
search is justified); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion) (dis-
cussing the history and policies behind the plain view doctrine); Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: 
The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 104–05 
(2004) (noting how the plain view doctrine allows the police to discover evidence without implicating 
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These judges have noted that, without search protocols, the government could 
engage in a full scale review of the seized computers and thereby view data not 
within the warrant’s scope.62 The government cannot name at the outset where 
relevant data is stored on the seized device; thus, search protocols provide 
some form of particularized description as how the government will find the 
items to be seized.63 Moreover, rather than having courts review the constitu-
tionality of searches afterwards at motions to suppress, search protocols allow 
judges to establish the constitutional limits on searches before their execu-
tion.64 By following search protocols, the government can search computers 
without violating the constitutional rights of defendants or risking suppression 
of any relevant evidence found in the search.65  
Search protocols can range in technical detail, with some describing gen-
eral strategies the government might employ in its search and others prescrib-
ing the precise methods and technologies the government must use.66 Some 
                                                                                                                           
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement). For more extensive discussions of the plain view 
doctrine’s application to digital searches, see Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 576–84 (2005); Guzzi, supra note 41; James Saylor, Note, Computers as 
Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Search-
es, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809 (2011). 
 62 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 962–63 (requiring a search protocol 
for a computer search because without a search protocol, the government would have “a license to 
roam through everything in the computer without limitation and without standards”); In re Search 
Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1183–84 (approving of a lower court’s search protocol for a computer search 
because it was a permissible way to limit the scope of the government’s search). 
 63 See In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1171 (observing how it is difficult to initially describe the 
place to be searched in computer searches because “particular information is not accessed through 
corridors and drawers, but through commands and queries”); Athul K. Acharya, Note, Semantic 
Searches, 63 DUKE L.J. 393, 414 n.137 (noting how search protocols aim to describe the place to be 
searched (citing Ohm, supra note 46, at 9–10)). 
 64 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (stating review at motion to 
suppress could lead to unnecessary exclusion of evidence); see also United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 
1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999) (excluding evidence found on defendant’s computer because the search 
performed with a warrant but without a search protocol violated the particularity requirement); United 
States v. Barbuto, No. 2:00CR197K, 2001 WL 670930, at *5 (D. Utah Apr. 12, 2001) (granting a 
motion to suppress documents seized from the defendant’s computer because the search violated the 
particularity requirement and stating that the government’s “[search] methods or criteria should have 
been presented to the magistrate before the issuance of the warrants”). 
65 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276 (suppressing evidence from a computer search done without a 
search protocol because the government’s overly broad search violated the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights); In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (requiring a search 
protocol for a computer search so that relevant evidence would not be suppressed). 
 66 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (discussing the different ways 
courts can craft search protocols and noting how courts can limit the search methods the government 
will use); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1183–84 (approving of a lower court’s search protocol 
that limited access to documents and files on the computer based on who created the documents and 
on what date the files were created); Derek Haynes, Note, Search Protocols: Establishing the Protec-
tions Mandated by the Fourth Amendment Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures in the World 
of Electronic Evidence, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 757, 771 (2009) (noting that search protocols will 
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basic search protocols simply limit the search to data created during specific 
time periods or to certain types of data, for example only text files or image 
files.67 Other search protocols place stricter limits on the search, requiring the 
government to provide the phrases and words it will use in keyword searches 
of the computer’s documents.68 Finally, the most exacting search protocols 
may combine all of these limitations and further require the government to 
name the software that it will use during the search and explain how the soft-
ware will be used to identify relevant data.69 
Commentators are divided as to both the efficacy and constitutionality of 
judicially required search protocols.70 Professor Orin Kerr, one of the leading 
scholars on the Fourth Amendment’s application to digital media, has argued 
that search protocols not only are ill-advised but also unconstitutionally in-
fringe the police’s power to execute warrants.71 Others argue that without 
search protocols, computer search warrants represent a return to general war-
rants, and that judges who impose search protocols are merely striking an ap-
propriate balance between the demands of the Fourth Amendment’s particulari-
ty requirement and the needs of police to investigate crimes.72 
                                                                                                                           
ideally set forth precise descriptions of the information sought from the seized device and the tech-
niques the police will use to discover that information). 
 67 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 956. 
 68 See id.; Haynes, supra note 66, at 771–72. But see COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 79 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/de
fault/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZED4-5LVF] (herein-
after COMPUTER CRIME) (describing the limitations of keyword searches and noting that “keyword 
searches will fail to find many kinds of files that fall within the scope of a warrant”). 
 69 See In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1182, 1184 (approving of a search protocol that required 
the police to obtain judicial preapproval before using certain software in a computer search and placed 
several other restrictions on how the police could search the computer); Haynes, supra note 66, at 765 
(listing several common targeted search methods courts require in search protocols for digital search-
es); see also In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 166 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying a search 
warrant for a cell phone that failed to include a precise explanation of all the different tools the gov-
ernment would use to search the device). 
 70 See Kerr, supra note 41, at 1246 (arguing that search protocols are misguided attempts at limit-
ing warrants, and judges should simply consider whether search was reasonable after the warrant has 
been executed); Ohm, supra note 46, at 11–12 (asserting the importance of strategies like search pro-
tocols in preventing computer search warrants from becoming general warrants); see also Brenner, 
supra note 60, at 186 (recognizing the difficult questions surrounding the effectiveness and constitu-
tionality of search protocols for computer searches). 
 71 See Kerr, supra note 41, at 1246. Kerr believes judges should not, as a policy matter, and can-
not, as a constitutional matter, set limits on the execution of warrants beforehand. Id. Rather, judges 
can only evaluate afterwards whether the police’s execution of the warrant was reasonable. Id.  
 72 See Friess, supra note 46, at 987 (arguing that judicial oversight through search protocols, 
specifically in search protocols for email searches, is necessary to balance the government’s need to 
investigate crime and the people’s Fourth Amendment rights); Ohm, supra note 46, at 11; Guzzi, 
supra note 41, at 335 (noting how if courts do not place limits on search warrants in the digital space, 
these warrants will become general warrants). Furthermore, they assert that earlier U.S. Supreme 
Court cases upon which Kerr bases his argument, such as Dalia and Grubbs, do not answer the ques-
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C. Riley v. California: The U.S. Supreme Court Brings the Fourth 
Amendment to Cell Phones 
This section explains the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. 
California, which applied the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to cell 
phone searches, but did not address what those search warrants must say.73 
Subsection 1 discusses the history of warrantless searches and the circuit split 
before Riley regarding whether the police could search cell phones without a 
warrant incident to an arrest.74 Subsection 2 provides an overview of the Riley 
decision and its potential impact on cell phone search warrants.75 
1. The History of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement 
Although a search performed without a warrant is presumed unreasona-
ble, the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the police’s right to search an 
arrestee’s person incident to arrest without a warrant.76 In 1973, in United 
States v. Robinson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a police officer could 
open a cigarette pack found on the defendant during a search of his person 
without obtaining a warrant.77 The Court reasoned that the officer’s safety con-
cerns and the threat of the destruction of evidence justified the warrantless 
search.78 
                                                                                                                           
tion of how the particularity requirement applies to digital media. See Friess, supra note 46, at 1015 
(reading Dalia to potentially support search protocols because Dalia identified ex ante restrictions on 
warrants as the “preferable approach” (quoting Dalia, 441 U.S. at 259 n.22)); Ohm, supra note 46, at 
3, 11. 
 73 See infra notes 73–94 and accompanying text. 
 74 See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
 76 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (stating “a search is reasonable only if it fails within a specific 
exception to the warrant requirement”); id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring) (characterizing the search 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement as an “ancient rule”); Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 
(stating that “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”); Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (noting how for a search to be reasonable, the govern-
ment usually must have a warrant); Payton, 445 U.S at 590 (holding a warrantless entry into a home 
to make a felony arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, absent exigent circumstances); United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding a warrantless search of an arrestee’s person incident 
to his arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 
(1914) (describing how courts have repeatedly affirmed the government’s right to search people inci-
dent to their arrests). 
 77 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 (holding that a police officer had right to inspect a cigarette pack 
and had authority to seize heroin found within the cigarette pack as evidence of criminal conduct). 
 78 See id. at 234 (stating the justification for a warrantless search incident to arrest of an arrestee’s 
person “rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it 
does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial”); see also Riley II, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2485 (explaining how Robinson established the dual justifications for the search incident to arrest 
exception even when there is no perceived threat to officer safety or of the destruction of evidence); 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (holding that an arresting officer may search the 
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In 2013, courts began to split over whether Robinson allowed the police 
to search cell phones incident to arrest without a warrant.79 Several circuit 
courts held the police could search cell phones incident to an arrest without 
first obtaining a warrant.80 Similarly, in February 2013, in People v. Riley, the 
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of California affirmed the denial of a 
motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search of the de-
fendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest.81 In contrast, in May 2013, in United 
States v. Wurie, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit held that the police could not search a cell phone incident to an arrest 
without a separate search warrant.82  
                                                                                                                           
arrestee for weapons and any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent the destruction of 
evidence). 
 79 Compare United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 12–13 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that the search 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to cell phone searches), aff’d sub 
nom. Riley v. California (Riley II), 134 S. Ct. 2473, with People v. Riley (Riley I), No. D059840, 2013 
WL 475242, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013) (holding that the search incident to arrest exception to 
the warrant requirement did apply to cell phone searches), rev’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473. 
 80 See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding the police could 
search an arrestee’s phone to find the phone number linked to the device, but indicating more invasive 
cell phone searches could require warrants); United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 712 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(recognizing that the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits all allow warrantless cell phone 
searches incident to arrest); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed. App’x. 216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding 
the police can search a person’s phone incident to arrest); United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 
411–12 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding the police could retrieve and read text messages from a cell phone 
found on an arrestee’s person because the need to preserve evidence on the phone justified the warrant-
less search); see also Charles E. MacLean, But Your Honor, a Cell Phone Is Not a Cigarette Pack: An 
Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to 
a Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 37, 54 (2012); Sara M. Corradi, Comment, Be Reasonable! Limit 
Warrantless Smart Phone Searches to Gant’s Justification, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 943, 948–49 
(2013); Evan O’Connor, Comment, The Search for a Limited Search: The First Circuit Denies the 
Search of Cell Phones Incident to an Arrest, 55 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 59, 64 (2013) http://bclaw
review.org/files/2014/02/05_OConnor.pdf [http://perma.cc/UGM2-PP6Z] (discussing the circuit split 
on whether cell phones can be searched incident to arrest without a warrant). 
 81 See Riley I, 2013 WL 475242, at *6. The defendant was arrested on weapons charges and, during 
a search of his person, the police seized his cell phone. See id. at *1–2. Detectives, who were investigat-
ing the defendant’s involvement in an attempted murder, examined the phone’s contact list, and viewed 
videos and pictures on the phone, finding evidence that defendant was a member of a gang. See id. at *3. 
As the defendant’s case was pending trial, in 2011, in People v. Diaz, the California Supreme Court held 
the police could search cell phones incident to an arrest without a warrant. Id.; People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 
501, 505 (Cal. 2011). Therefore, the California Court of Appeal applied Diaz to the defendant’s case and 
upheld denial of the motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone. See Riley I, 2013 WL 475242, 
at *6. 
 82 Wurie, 728 F.3d at 13; see also Roy K. Altman, The Case for Incident-to-Arrest Searches of 
Cell Phones, 29 CRIM. JUST. 28, 28 (2014) (noting how the First Circuit was the only federal appellate 
court to deny warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest and criticizing the First Circuit’s 
distinction between cell phones and other property that may be searched incident to arrest); O’Connor, 
supra note 80, at 63–64 (discussing how the First Circuit found that the search incident to arrest ex-
ception should not apply because there was no immediate need for the police to search the phone). 
The First Circuit stated that to allow the police to search a cell phone incident to an arrest for even the 
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In order to resolve this deepening split, on January 17, 2014, the U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to both Riley and Wurie.83 When the Court 
heard oral arguments on April 29, 2014, the justices appeared skeptical of Cali-
fornia and the United States’ position that the police should always be allowed 
to search cell phones incident to an arrest without a warrant.84 At the same 
time, the justices questioned how to limit the scope of cell phone search war-
rants if the Court were to require them.85 
                                                                                                                           
most minor of traffic infractions would authorize the exact type of unfettered government rummaging the 
Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 9. The court recognized that most 
people carry a significant amount of personal and private information in their cell phones, far more in-
formation than individuals would have previously carried on their person. See id. Furthermore, the court 
concluded its duty to provide clear guidelines to officers in the field compelled them to craft a bright-line 
rule: absent exigent circumstances, the police must get a warrant to search a cell phone. See id. at 13. 
The dissent argued that the court should not disregard longstanding Fourth Amendment precedent on 
searches incident to arrest just because the object searched is a cell phone. See id. at 14 (Howard, J., 
dissenting). 
 83 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 999, 999 (2014) (mem.) (granting certiorari); United States v. 
Wurie, 134 S. Ct. 999, 999 (2014) (mem.) (same); Adam Lamparello & Charles MacLean, Back to the 
Future: Returning to Reasonableness and Particularity Under the Fourth Amendment, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
BULL. 101, 102 (2014) http://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ILRB_99_LamparelloMac
Lean.pdf [http://perma.cc/T8VG-ALUR] (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari and calling 
on the Court to require warrants to search cell phones); Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Cellphone 
Privacy, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2014, 2:33 PM), http:// www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/court-to-rule-
on-cellphone-privacy/ [http://perma.cc/RB8V-V3BP] (observing how the Court’s grant of certiorari 
would pit police power against new privacy interests in technology). 
 84 See Oral Argument at 0:04, 28:00, Riley II, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-132), http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2010–2019/2013/2013_13_132 [hereinafter Riley II Oral Argument]; Amy Howe, A Whole New 
World: Today’s Oral Arguments in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 29, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/a-whole-new-world-todays-oral-arguments-in-plain-english/ [http://
perma.cc/LYC2-2CKJ] (describing the justices’ criticisms of the government’s argument and the 
justices’ search for a more limited approach). 
 85 See Riley II Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 12:08, 16:48. Chief Justice John Roberts won-
dered how a judge could limit the scope of a warrant when it could often be reasonable to assume that 
the entirety of the phone could have relevant evidence. See id. at 12:30, 14:00. Riley’s attorney tried to 
list applications that would hold no relevant evidence, citing a banking application as having no reasona-
ble connection to a drug offense. See id. Chief Justice Roberts responded that a bank transaction could 
demonstrate when a particular drug deal took place. See id. Justice Elena Kagan stated that a magistrate 
could place whatever limitations on the warrant he or she feels are appropriate. See id. at 55:53. Assis-
tant Solicitor General Michael Dreeben disagreed with Justice Kagan’s assertion and cited to Grubbs 
and Dalia as precluding a magistrate from setting forth limitations on how the police execute the war-
rant. See id. at 56:00. Before the discussion could continue, Dreeben’s time expired. See id. at 56:30. 
Professor Kerr noted this exchange at oral argument between Justice Kagan and Dreeben as demon-
strative of the future issues involving search protocols and searches of digital media. See Orin Kerr, 
The Role of Warrants in the Cell Phone Search Cases, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/29/the-role-of-warrants-in-the-
cell-phone-search-cases/ [http://perma.cc/83LR-LDW2]. 
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2. Riley v. California: The Court Reaffirms the Warrant Requirement 
On June 25, 2014, in Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court unani-
mously held that the police must obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone 
in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.86 Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Roberts recognized how modern cell phones have become an essential 
part of the daily lives of most Americans.87 To the Court, because cell phones 
often store massive amounts of personal information, it would be inappropriate 
to allow officers immediate access to cell phones.88 The Court compared cell 
phones to homes, the most protected of spaces under the Fourth Amendment, 
and noted that the search of a cell phone would in many cases reveal more in-
formation than even an extensive search of a home.89 The Court stated that to 
allow the search of cell phones incident to arrests would be to allow the exact 
type of limitless searches the Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit.90 
Both the Court’s unanimity and its bright-line rule requiring a search war-
rant for cell phones surprised many Fourth Amendment scholars and sparked 
debate over the future applications of the decision.91 In recent years, the Court 
has often deferred to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and, 
in many contexts, allowed warrantless government searches.92 To flatly require 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. The Court did note that the exigent circumstances exception to 
the warrant requirement would likely still likely apply to cell phone searches. Id. at 2494. Justice 
Samuel Alito joined the court’s opinion in part, but wrote a separate concurrence to discuss the history 
of the search incident to arrest exception and to emphasize that his view on cell phone searches may 
change if Congress and state legislatures enacted statutes regulating these searches. See id. at 2495, 
2497 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 87 See id. at 2484 (majority opinion) (describing how a “proverbial visitor from Mars might con-
clude [cell phones] were an important feature of human anatomy”). 
 88 See id. at 2485. 
 89 See id. at 2491.  
 90 See id. at 2494–95. The Court invoked the historical impetus for the Fourth Amendment, re-
counting how the British government used general warrants to search invasively through the private 
lives and materials of American colonists. Id. 
 91 See Ryan Watzel, Riley’s Implications for Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud, 124 
YALE L.J. F. 73 (2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/rileys-implications-in-the-cloud [http:// 
perma.cc/63G3-Y7ZF] (noting how the court provided a clear answer to whether a warrant is required 
to search a phone); Adam Gershowitz, Symposium: Surprising Unanimity, Even More Surprising 
Clarity, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-
surprising-unanimity-even-more-surprising-clarity/ [http://perma.cc/5MMW-QPFE] (asserting that the 
Court’s unanimous holding was “rather startling”); Amy Howe, Get a Warrant! Today’s Cellphone 
Privacy Decision in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2014, 5:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog. 
com/2014/06/get-a-warrant-todays-cellphone-privacy-decision-in-plain-english/ [http://perma.cc/
7ZP2-Q7XR] (expressing surprise over the Court’s unanimity because the Court dealt with such an 
important privacy issue). 
 92 See, e.g., King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858 (holding a warrantless entry into home was justified by the 
exigency of the threat of destruction of evidence); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346 (2009) (holding 
a warrantless search of an arrestee’s car is permitted when an arrestee is in reaching distance of the 
vehicle or when an officer reasonably believes the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest); 
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a warrant was a major surprise to many observers.93 Scholars immediately be-
gan to speculate about how lower courts would apply Riley both when issuing 
cell phone search warrants and when hearing particularity challenges to cell 
phone search warrants.94 
II. LOWER COURTS ATTEMPT TO CRAFT CELL PHONE SEARCH WARRANTS 
THAT COMPLY WITH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S  
PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT  
After the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. California, the 
question remained: what must a cell phone search warrant contain to satisfy 
the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement?95 Accordingly, this Part 
outlines how lower courts have limited the scope of cell phone search war-
rants.96 Section A discusses courts that have required detailed search protocols 
for cell phone search warrants in order to comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment’s particularity requirement.97 Section B examines courts that have not 
required search protocols for cell phone search warrants.98  
A. Ensuring Particularity with Search Protocols: Courts Requiring Search 
Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants 
In 2014, two magistrate judges in two different federal district courts held 
that the government must submit search protocols along with their warrant ap-
plications for cell phone searches in order to meet the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement.99 U.S. Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola of the Dis-
                                                                                                                           
Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (stating that “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasona-
bleness”). 
 93 See The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Leading Cases, 128 HARV. L. REV. 251, 251 (2014) 
(stating the Riley decision represents a break from the U.S. Supreme Court’s trend of allowing search-
es without warrants); Gershowitz, supra note 91; Richard Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital 
Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourth-amendment/ [http://perma.cc/F7YE-4Z33] (seeing 
Riley as founding a new era of Fourth Amendment interpretation and protection in the digital age). 
 94 See Pincus, supra note 12, at 329–36 (discussing the potential applications of Riley on email 
messages, cell phone location information, and border searches of digital information); Hall, supra 
note 13 (arguing that the particularity requirement will be a recurring issue in warrants for cell phone 
searches); Re, supra note 93 (arguing that after Riley, more defendants will challenge computer 
searches, including searches done pursuant to warrants). 
95 See Riley v. California (Riley II), 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding that the police must 
obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone); Hall, supra note 13 (noting how the Court did not 
resolve how arguing the particularity requirement applies to cell phone searches). 
 96 See infra notes 96–157 and accompanying text. 
 97 See infra notes 99–140 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 141–157 and accompanying text. 
 99 See, e.g., In re Cellular Tels., No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 
30, 2014); In re Search of Premises Known as Three Cellphones & One Micro-SD Card, No. L4-MJ-
8013-DJW, 2014 WL 3845157, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 4, 2014); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., No. 14-MJ-
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trict Court for the District of Columbia and U.S. Magistrate Judge David Wax-
se of the District Court for the District of Kansas have both refused to issue 
search warrants for cell phones without detailed search protocols that clearly 
explain how the government will avoid searching and seizing material outside 
the warrant’s scope.100 Both judges reasoned that issuing cell phone search 
warrants without search protocols would authorize the type of general searches 
that the Fourth Amendment forbids.101 Subsection 1 discusses Judge Facciola’s 
opinions requiring search protocols.102 Subsection 2 discusses Judge Waxse’s 
interpretation of Riley as mandating search protocols for cell phone search 
warrants.103 
1. U.S. Magistrate Judge Facciola of the District Court for the District of 
Columbia Establishes the Model for Cell Phone Search Protocols 
In March 2014, U.S. Magistrate Judge Facciola of the District Court for 
the District of Columbia issued a series of three opinions denying cell phone 
search warrant applications because each application failed to include a de-
tailed search protocol and thereby violated the Fourth Amendment’s particular-
ity requirement.104 First, on March 11, 2014, in In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 
                                                                                                                           
8005-DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, at *14 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014); In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. 
Supp. 3d 159, 168 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 
4707213703415 in Custody of U.S. Postal Inspection Serv., 1400 New York Ave. NW, Wash., D.C., 
28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 46 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79 (D.D.C. 
2014); see also Hall, supra note 13 (discussing how the District Court for the District of Kansas relied 
on Riley to require search protocols for cell phone search warrants). 
 100 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *12 (requiring the government to submit 
a search protocol that precisely explained how the police determine what sections of the smartphone’s 
hard drive are within the scope of the warrant); In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 
(finding deficient the government’s proposed search protocol because it failed to provide the method 
by which the government would decide where on the phone it would search). 
 101 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14 (stating how “[i]f the Court were to 
authorize this warrant, it would be contradicting the manifest purpose of the Fourth Amendment par-
ticularity requirement, which is to prevent general searches”); In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 
F. Supp. 3d at 78 (stating the government’s proposed warrant would authorize “precisely the type of 
‘general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’ that the Fourth Amendment prohibits” 
(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (plurality opinion))). 
 102 See infra notes 104–127 and accompanying text. 
 103 See infra notes 128–140 and accompanying text. 
 104 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168; In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus 
Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 46; In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 
F. Supp. 3d at 79. Judge Facciola has issued several controversial opinions involving the Fourth 
Amendment’s application to digital technology. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redact-
ed]@mac.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 152 (D.D.C.) 
(denying the government’s warrant application for all emails associated with a specific email address 
because the warrant would authorize the seizure of emails for which probable cause had not been 
established), vacated, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Application of the U.S. of Am. for a 
Search Warrant for a Black Kyocera Corp. Model C5170 Cellular Tel. with FCCC ID: V65V5170, 
No. 14-231 (JMF), 2014 WL 1089442, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2014) (denying the government’s war-
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the District Court for the District of Columbia denied a warrant application 
that sought to search and seize “[a]ll records contained in the cellular 
phones.”105 Judge Facciola stated that the application failed to specify the in-
formation sought and failed to explain how the government would avoid seiz-
ing irrelevant information.106 Judge Facciola explained that a detailed search 
protocol would address the court’s concerns and suggested that future warrant 
applications for cell phones contain search protocols.107 
In a warrant application nine days later, the government did submit a search 
protocol, but it failed to address Judge Facciola’s particularity concerns.108 On 
March 20, 2014, in In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial Number 
4704213703415, the District Court for the District of Columbia denied a warrant 
application to search several mobile devices.109 The application included a 
search protocol, which set forth in general terms how the government would 
                                                                                                                           
rant application to search a cell phone the defendant dropped while the police pursued him because no 
warrant is required to search abandoned property); In re Search of Information Associated with the 
Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by 
Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding the government lacked probable cause 
to search and seize Facebook account information from third parties who communicated with a specif-
ic Facebook user and requiring minimization procedures to limit data seized from Facebook); Ann E. 
Marimow & Craig Timberg, Low-Level Federal Judges Balking at Law Enforcement Requests for 
Electronic Evidence, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/low-
level-federal-judges-balking-at-law-enforcement-requests-for-electronic-evidence/2014/04/24/eec
81748-c01b-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html [http://perma.cc/SFH7-N6XB] (describing Judge 
Facciola’s opinions as some of the “most aggressive” rebukes of law enforcement requests for digital 
personal data); Joe Palazzolo, Judges Rebel Against Prosecutors’ Bulk Requests for Emails in Probes, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2014, 6:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023038478045
79479513205095706 [http://perma.cc/ME9A-3VL5] (discussing Judge Facciola’s repeated denials of 
broad applications to search email accounts). 
 105 See In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 75, 80. During an investigation regard-
ing the distribution of child pornography, the government obtained a warrant to search a hotel room. 
See id. at 76. The government seized six computing devices, including an iPhone 4 and two Samsung 
cell phones. See id. The government further stated that it wished to seize: “Any and all list of names, 
telephone numbers, and addresses stored as contacts to include pictures. . . . Images, pictures, photo-
graphs sent or received by user. . . . The content of any and all text messages sent or received by us-
er. . . . The content of any and all voice mail messages. . . . Any and all evidence of passwords needed 
to access the user cell phone.” Id. 
 106 See id. at 78. 
 107 See id. at 79. The court posed several questions that it hoped future warrant applications would 
answer, including whether all of the cell phones would be imaged, how long any such images would 
be stored, what procedures the government would use to avoid viewing material outside the warrant’s 
scope, and what would happen if the government discovered unrelated incriminating evidence during 
its search. See id. at 79–80. 
 108 See In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 46. 
 109 See id. at 43. During a search of the defendant’s hotel room as a part of an investigation into 
the distribution of child pornography, the government seized four electronic devices: a Sony laptop, a 
Fujifilm digital camera, an LG cell phone, and an ODYS tablet. See id. at 41–42. The government’s 
warrant application to search the devices contained three attachments: Attachment A, which described 
the devices to be searched, Attachment B, which described the information to be seized, and Attach-
ment C, which was titled “Search Protocol.” See id. 
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search the mobile devices.110 The court held that some sections of the govern-
ment’s search protocol failed to provide necessary details on how the search 
would be executed.111 At the same time, the court found that other sections of the 
protocol proposed search methods it would not authorize.112 For example, as a 
part of its search, the government sought to “image” each device’s internal stor-
age, a process that creates a copy of the device’s entire hard drive.113 Judge Fac-
ciola rejected this search method, stating that imaging by its nature would seize 
data beyond the proper scope of the investigation.114 Judge Facciola concluded 
that unless the search protocol provided a technical explanation of how the gov-
ernment would conduct a more limited search of the defendant’s phone, the war-
rant application would fail to meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity re-
quirement.115 
A week later, Judge Facciola denied another of the government’s cell 
phone search protocol submissions and explained in greater detail why the par-
ticularity requirement mandates search protocols for cell phone search war-
rants.116 On March 26, 2014, in In re Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI 
                                                                                                                           
110 Id. at 43. In the proposed search protocol in Attachment C, the government noted that it 
planned to image the seized devices, that it would provide copies of the files it seized upon request, 
and that if during its search the government found evidence of criminal activity beyond the warrant’s 
scope, it would apply for a new search warrant. Id. The government also made clear that it still did not 
believe a search protocol was required for its search, basing its reasoning on Professor Kerr’s view of 
search protocols. Id. (citing Kerr, supra note 41, at 1242). 
111 See id. at 44–45 (stating Attachment B’s list of items to be seized “should serve as a model . . . 
for future applications,” but finding Attachment C’s proposed search protocol failed to address the 
court’s concerns on the warrant’s scope). The proposed search protocol failed to make clear whether the 
government would retain electronic copies of all the data contained in the devices and also failed to ex-
plain whether the investigating officers would be involved in the search of the devices, a detail the court 
wished to know in order to better understand who would be involved in the search. See id. at 45. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id.; MICHAEL J. HANNON, DIGITAL EVIDENCE: COMPUTER FORENSICS AND LEGAL IS-
SUES ARISING FROM COMPUTER INVESTIGATIONS 15 (2012) (explaining how computer forensic spe-
cialists create images, also called “mirror images” and “bit stream images,” when searching and seiz-
ing devices). The government would retain this image until the defendant’s case, including any appeals, 
had concluded. See In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 
F. Supp. 3d at 45. The government argued that it needed to retain the complete image of the device’s 
hard drive because a partial image of the device, from which information had been deleted, might 
present later chain of custody issues. See id. at 46. The court disagreed, saying that the same testimony 
about chain of custody for a complete image of the device’s hard drive would suffice for a partial 
image. See id. 
 114 See In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 45. 
 115 See id. at 46. 
 116 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 166, 169 (stating detailed search protocols 
help satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and denying the government’s warrant 
application for failing to provide enough details in its proposed search protocol); see also Tim Cushing, 
DC Judge Smacks Down Government for Vague iPhone Search Warrant, TECHDIRT (Apr. 9, 2014), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140404/10040126800/dc-judge-smacks-down-government-vague-
iphone-search-warrant.shtml [https://perma.cc/KRB9-2Q9Z] (characterizing the court as fighting for 
Fourth Amendment rights against the government’s expansive view of digital searches); Cyrus Fari-
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013888003738427, the District Court for the District of Columbia considered 
the government’s warrant application to search a college student’s iPhone.117 
The application contained a new section titled “Electronic Storage and Foren-
sic Analysis,” which gave some examples of forensic methods the government 
would use in searching the iPhone.118 The new section explained that the gov-
ernment would subject the entire phone to “computer-assisted scans” and, rely-
ing on those scans, search smaller parts of the phone via “human inspec-
tion.”119 Again the court denied the government’s application, holding that 
phrases such as “computer-assisted scans” were too broad and placed insuffi-
cient limits on the search.120 To Judge Facciola, a permissible search protocol 
must explain with technical language the exact methods the government will 
use when deciding where on the phone it will search and for what it will 
search.121 
                                                                                                                           
var, Judge Denies Gov’t Request to Search Suspect’s iPhone in Ricin Case, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 26, 
2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/03/judge-denies-govt-request-to-search-suspects-
iphone-in-ricin-case/ [http://perma.cc/XNZ8-47SA] (discussing the court’s desire for specific tech-
nical language in future search protocols); Dan Ivers, Feds Lose Bid to Search Phone in Georgetown 
Ricin Case, LAW360 (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/522156/feds-lose-bid-to-
search-phone-in-georgetown-ricin-case [http://perma.cc/6DAP-WCWK] (observing that the court 
“chastised the government” for failing to provide specific details on how the government would con-
duct its search); Sara Kropf, Did the Founding Fathers Think the Fourth Amendment Would Protect 
Our iPhones?, GRAND JURY TARGET (Apr. 15, 2014), http://grandjurytarget.com/2014/04/15/did-the-
founding-fathers-think-the-fourth-amendment-would-protect-our-iphones/ [http://perma.cc/543K-
NMQB] (applauding the court for resisting the government’s efforts to search beyond the scope of its 
investigation and considering whether other courts would follow the court’s reasoning). 
 117 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 161. The government was investigating the 
student for manufacturing ricin in his dorm room. See id. The student told investigators that he found the 
formula for ricin searching the Internet on his iPhone. See Justin Jouvenal & Ann E. Marimow, In 
Georgetown Ricin Case, a Portrait of a Student with a Sharp Mind, Many Troubles, WASH. POST (Mar. 
25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/georgetown-student-alleged-to-have-ricin-may-
have-been-a-threat-to-someone/2014/03/25/73ba55d6-b434-11e3-8020-b2d790b3c9e1_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/4NQM-N72L]. The student later pleaded guilty to unregistered possession of a biologi-
cal agent or toxin. See Keith Alexander, Georgetown Student Gets 1-Year Term for Possession of Ricin 
He Said Was for Suicide, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/
georgetown-university-student-expected-to-be-sentenced-for-possessing-ricin/2014/11/10/318c4466-
68d5-11e4-9fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html [http://perma.cc/T3U7-WJ8Y]; Jouvenal & Marimow, supra. 
 118 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 162–63. This section stated that the search 
may involve scans of the entire device in order to determine what data on the device is evidence with-
in the warrant’s scope. Id. at 163. According to the application, more specific searches, such as target-
ed keyword searches, could fail to expose certain types of data relevant to the investigation. Id. The 
section also explained how investigators and an FBI technical review team would work together to ana-
lyze the iPhone, addressing the concern raised in In re Black iPhone 4 as to whether investigators would 
be involved in the search of the devices. Id. 
 119 See id. 
 120 See id. at 166. 
 121 See id. The court encouraged the government to use phrases such as “MD5 hash values,” 
“metadata,” “registry,” “write blocking,” and “status marker,” and to name specific software used for 
the search in its future applications. See id. at 168. 
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Judge Facciola found earlier views of the particularity requirement, such 
as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Dalia v. United States, inappli-
cable to search protocols.122 According to Judge Facciola, search protocols do 
not limit how the government executes a warrant.123 Rather, a detailed search 
protocol explains to the court how the government will determine the place to 
be searched.124 In Dalia, the government had set forth a particular description 
of the place to be searched—it described in detail the office in which it would 
install the listening device.125 Unlike in Dalia, the government could not speci-
fy beforehand the exact place in the iPhone’s memory it would search, for 
without some form of initial scan, it could not determine which parts of the 
phone’s internal storage may contain relevant data.126 To Judge Facciola, be-
cause the government could not at the outset provide a particularized descrip-
tion of the place to be searched, it had to provide a detailed search protocol to 
assure the court that it had a certain location in mind.127 
2. U.S. Magistrate Judge Waxse of the District Court for the District of 
Kansas Finds Riley v. California Mandates Cell Phone Search Protocols 
Like Judge Facciola, Judge Waxse has also found that the particularity re-
quirement mandates search protocols for cell phone search warrants.128 For 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See id. at 167 (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257–58 (1979)). 
 123 See id. But see Kerr, supra note 41, at 1266 (arguing that mandatory search protocols in war-
rants for computer searches resemble the restrictions on bugging warrants found constitutionally un-
necessary in Dalia). Most scholars who argue for search protocols in digital searches differ from 
Judge Facciola’s view, asserting that search protocols are limits on how the government executes 
warrants, but that they are constitutionally permissible. See Friess, supra note 46, at 1015 (interpreting 
Dalia to encourage limitations on the execution of warrants even if the Fourth Amendment does not 
require such limitations); Ohm, supra note 46, at 3–4 (reading Dalia to allow, but not mandate, ex 
ante restrictions on searches); Guzzi, supra note 41, at 310 n.62 (noting Dalia does not state that a 
judge cannot place limitations on how the government will execute warrants). 
 124 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167. 
 125 See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 256 (finding the challenged warrant particularly described the office the 
government sought to bug). 
 126 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167. The court viewed the place to be 
searched as the component parts of the phone’s flash drive. See id. The court explained how the Apple 
iPhone’s NAND flash drive contains a series of blocks, known as NAND Flash blocks, which are the 
smallest erasable unit of the device. See id. Without running some form of computer scan, the gov-
ernment could not possibly determine what type of data each block contains. See id. 
 127 See id. The court relied on the Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Search Warrant, 
which upheld a lower court’s power to require search protocols for computer searches. See 71 A.3d 
1158, 1171 (Vt. 2012) (holding detailed search protocols to be “an acceptable way,” but not a consti-
tutionally required method, of particularly describing the place to be searched), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 185 (2013). 
 128 See In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *1, *2 (applying Riley to hold that cell phone 
search warrants must contain search protocols); In re Search of Premises Known as Three Cellphones, 
2014 WL 3845157, at *2 (same); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14 (same). Like 
Judge Facciola, Judge Waxse has also issued several controversial decisions on the Fourth Amend-
ment’s application to searches of digital media. See In re Search of Premises Known as Three Cell-
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example, on June 26, 2014, in In re Nextel Cellular Telephone, the District 
Court for the District of Kansas denied a warrant application for a cell phone 
search because the application’s proposed search protocol was overly broad.129 
The government’s warrant application included a search protocol in a section 
titled “Search Methodology To Be Employed.”130 The protocol gave examples 
of some general search methods the government might utilize, including exam-
ining all of the data stored in the phone in order to determine what information 
is relevant to its investigation.131 The court held the proposed search methods 
violated the particularity requirement because they allowed the government to 
engage in general rummaging without naming a specific place on the phone it 
would search or the items it hoped to seize.132 
Judge Waxse grounded his decision in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 de-
cision in Riley v. California and in Judge Facciola’s series of D.C. District 
                                                                                                                           
phones, 2014 WL 3845157, at *2; In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14; In re Appli-
cations for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Accounts/Skype Accounts, No. 
13-MJ-8163-JPO, 2013 WL 4647554, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (denying a warrant application 
authorizing search and seizure of all email communications associated with a specific email account 
because the search would be overly broad); In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associat-
ed with Target Email Address, No. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *9 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 
2012) (denying a warrant application because the government failed to show probable cause to search 
the contents of all emails associated with a specific email address); Julie Bort, This Judge Blocked the 
Feds from Reading Emails Stored by Yahoo, Google, Verizon, Skype, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/judge-says-no-to-feds-reading-emails-2013-9 [http://perma.cc/6BAF-
YHDK] (calling Judge Waxse’s denial of a warrant to search email accounts an interesting and mean-
ingful opinion limiting the government’s surveillance powers); Hall, supra note 13 (stating that Judge 
Waxse’s opinion in In re Nextel Cellular Telephone was a fascinating application of the Riley deci-
sion); Palazzolo, supra note 104 (discussing Judge Waxse’s rejection or modification of warrant ap-
plications involving searches of digital media); Somini Sengupta, Judge Says Search Warrants for E-
mails Must Be ‘Limited,’ N. Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 30, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes
.com/2013/08/30/judge-says-search-warrants-for-e-mails-must-be-limited/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
2NKD-UZJD] (characterizing Judge Waxse’s denial of warrants to search email accounts as an im-
portant holding in defining unreasonable searches and seizures in the digital age). 
 129 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14. 
130 See id. at *2. Judge Waxse had previously denied search warrants for emails because the gov-
ernment had not proposed a search protocol. In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associ-
ated with Target Email Accounts/Skype Accounts, 2013 WL 4647554, at *8. These earlier search war-
rant applications had not included a similar “Search Methodologies to be Employed” section. Id. at 
*1–2. In In re Nextel Cellular Telephone, it appears the government added this new section in order to 
address these particularity issues. See 2014 WL 2898262, at *3 (recognizing the new section in the 
search warrant but still finding the warrant overbroad). 
 131 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *2. The government also requested per-
mission to open any files in order to determine their contents and indicated that their search would 
include at a minimum an examination of the phone’s contact lists, calendars, picture and video files, 
internet history, and text messages. See id. The government made clear that it might use other search 
methods not named in its application. See id. 
 132 See id. at *10 (stating the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement protects against 
“general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings” (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (plu-
rality opinion)). 
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Court opinions.133 Because Riley recognized that cell phones contain deeply 
personal information, Judge Waxse asserted that the court had a duty to protect 
such information from overly broad searches.134 Moreover, Judge Waxse found 
the government’s search methodology to be even less detained than the defi-
cient search protocol Judge Facciola rejected in Apple iPhone, the case of the 
college student’s iPhone.135 Following Judge Facciola, Judge Waxse explained 
that future search protocol submissions must include technical language setting 
forth precisely how the government would determine what data come within 
the scope of the warrant.136 
In two subsequent opinions denying cell phone search warrants, Judge 
Waxse provided further explanation of why the particularity requirement man-
dates search protocols.137 Judge Waxse framed his particularity analysis as a bal-
ancing test between the government’s need to investigate crime and the people’s 
right of privacy.138 Citing the U.S Supreme Court’s recognition of the heightened 
privacy interests in cell phones in Riley, Judge Waxse concluded that cell phone 
searches without search protocols would tip the scales too far in favor of the 
government.139 Judge Waxse asserted that other lower courts should engage in 
this balancing test after Riley and reconsider Fourth Amendment precedent that 
may strike an unfair balance when applied to cell phone searches.140 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See id. at *9. The court provided detailed summaries of each of Judge Facciola’s opinions. Id. 
at *6–9; see In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (opinion by Judge Facciola denying 
cell phone search warrants); In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 
F. Supp. 3d at 46 (same); In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F.Supp. 3d at 79 (same). The court also 
relied on precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on the particularity requirement’s 
application to computer searches. See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *5; see also 
United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing the importance of the partic-
ularity requirement in searches of digital media); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (applying the particularity requirement to computer searches); United States v. Leary, 846 
F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating the particularity requirements commands the government to 
“describe the items to be seized with as much specificity as the government’s knowledge and circum-
stances allow”). 
 134 In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *4, *14; see Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 
(observing that cell phones often store private and personal information). 
 135 In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *12; see In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 
F. Supp. 3d at 161, 166 (denying an application to search a college student’s iPhone because the 
search protocol did not provide enough detail on the methods the government would use in its search). 
 136 In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *12; see In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 
F. Supp. 3d at 168 (providing examples of technical language, including “MD5 hash values,” 
“metadata,” “registry,” “write blocking,” and “status marker”). 
 137 See In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *2 (noting how the court would provide a more 
thorough explanation of why it requires search protocols for cell phone search warrants); In re Search 
of Premises Known as Three Cellphones, 2014 WL 3845157, at *2 (discussing why the particularity 
requirement and Riley mandate search protocols for cell phone search warrants). 
 138 See In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *3. 
 139 Id. at *8, *11; see Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95. 
 140 See In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *4. 
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B. Inferring Scope Limits or Deferring the Protocol Question: Courts That 
Do Not Require Search Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants  
Other courts, rather than requiring search protocols for cell phone search 
warrants, have either inferred particularity limits into facially broad warrants 
or found other ways to resolve particularity challenges to cell phone search 
warrants.141 On September 14, 2014, in Hedgepath v. Kentucky, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court upheld two warrants authorizing cell phone searches that were 
challenged on particularity grounds.142 The warrants authorized the police to 
search the defendant’s apartment and vehicle and both listed cell phones as 
property to be seized and searched at those locations.143 Neither of the war-
rants, however, placed limitations on parts of the phones the police could 
search or the type of information the police sought to find on the phones.144 
The court held both warrants provided sufficiently particular descriptions of 
the evidence sought because the “clear thrust” of the warrants was to authorize 
only the search and seizure of evidence related to the alleged sexual assault.145 
Therefore, although the warrants placed no explicit limits on the scope of the 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See, e.g., United States v. Lustyik, No. 13-CR-616-VB, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 29, 2014) (finding Second Circuit precedent prevented the court from requiring search protocols 
for cell phone search warrants); Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.3d 119, 130–31 (Ky. 2014) 
(reading a facially broad cell phone search warrant narrowly in order to avoid a particularity issue); 
State v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 616, 633 (Neb. 2014) (holding the cell phone search warrant at issue 
was so broad that the court did not need to decide whether all cell phone search warrants needed 
search protocols). 
 142 See Hedgepath, 441 S.W.3d at 130; see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Cell Phones and Every-
thing Else: Criminal Law Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2013–2014 Term, 50 CT. REV. 164, 165 
(2014) (discussing the Kentucky Supreme Court’s interpretation in Hedgepath v. Commonwealth of 
what warrants authorizing the search of a phone need to contain in order to be sufficiently particular); 
Search Warrant for Suspect’s Mobile Phone Need Not Be Limited to Particular Functions, CRIM. 
DEF. NETWORK (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.criminal-defense-network.com/news/search-warrant-for-
suspects-mobile-phone-need-not-be-limited-to-particular-functions/ [http://perma.cc/D9UK-M8CN] 
(observing how Hedgepath provides one solution to the ongoing challenge of how to apply the partic-
ularity requirement to cell phone searches). 
 143 See Hedgepath, 441 S.W.3d at 126–27. The warrants authorized the search and seizure of “all 
personal property including but not limited to all electronic equipment, computers, and cell phones.” 
See id. The warrant application further stated that the police believed the listed property was either 
used in the commission of a crime or would show that a crime had been committed and listed the 
crime under investigation as assault. See id. After the police discovered the defendant’s phone in his 
vehicle, they searched the phone and found several incriminating videos that appeared to show the de-
fendant sexually assaulting the victim. See id. at 123. The trial court, in a decision issued before Riley, 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because it found the defendant did not have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his phone and therefore no warrant was required to search the phone. See id. at 
129. 
 144 See id. at 130. 
 145 See id. Before the section on cell phones, both warrants called for the search and seizure of 
any blood, semen, fibers, hairs, or other physical evidence resulting from the sexual assault. See id. 
Because these earlier sections contained detailed descriptions of physical evidence to be seized, the court 
imputed these specific limitations onto the authorization to search the cell phone. See id. 
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cell phone searches, the court inferred that the searches were limited to evi-
dence of the alleged crime and held the warrants did not violate the particulari-
ty requirement.146 
Other courts have considered the potential need for search protocols for 
cell phone search warrants in light of Riley v. California, but have not held the 
particularity requirement mandates them.147 On October 17, 2014, in State v. 
Henderson, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that two cell phone search 
warrants violated the particularity requirement because they did not list either 
the specific crimes or the specific types of information the government sought 
from the seized phone.148 Because the government’s warrants authorized the 
police to search and seize “[a]ny and all” information contained in the defend-
ant’s phone, the warrants clearly failed to provide sufficient limitations on 
what places in the phone could be searched and what data in the phone could 
be seized.149 The court then discussed search protocols for cell phone searches 
and how Riley will likely lead to changes in how courts apply the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement to cell phone searches.150 But because 
the warrants before the court so clearly violated the traditional demands of par-
ticularity, the court concluded that it was unnecessary to decide whether search 
protocols are mandatory or proper for all cell phone search warrants.151 
Some federal district courts appear to be awaiting direction from circuit 
courts on whether Riley should be read to mandate search protocols.152 For in-
                                                                                                                           
 146 See id. at 131. 
 147 See Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 n.12; Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633–34. 
 148 See Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633; see also John Wesley Hall, NE: Cell phone SW Was 
Overbroad for “[A]ny and All Information” but Still Saved by GFE, FOURTHAMENDMENT.COM (Oct. 
21, 2014), http://fourthamendment.com/?p=13826 [http://perma.cc/K9V9-P6DJ] (discussing the hold-
ing in State v. Henderson and noting that the case could be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to 
clarify how lower courts should review facially broad cell phone search warrants); State Courts Are 
Divided as to How to Apply Particularity Requirement to Search of Phone, CRIM. DEF. NETWORK 
(Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.criminal-defense-network.com/news/state-courts-are-divided-as-to-how-
to-apply-particularity-requirement-to-search-of-phone/ [http://perma.cc/2733-VT24]. 
 149 See Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633. The application provided some examples of areas to be 
searched, including contacts, call logs, text messages, and voicemails, as well as “any other infor-
mation that can be gained from the internal components and/or memory Cards.” See id. at 625. When 
the defendant challenged the first warrant as being overly broad, the police applied for and received the 
second warrant. See id. at 626. The second warrant added a brief statement describing how suspects in 
shootings often communicate through cell phones. See id. 
 150 See id. at 633–34. The court observed how other lower courts and scholars are debating the 
need for search protocols in digital searches. See id. at 633 (citing United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring)); In re 
Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1171; Kerr, supra note 41; Ohm, supra note 46. 
 151 See Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633–34. The court ended up affirming the lower court’s denial of 
the defendant’s motion to suppress under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, finding that 
the police had relied in good faith on the warrants. See id. at 634. 
 152 See, e.g., Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 n.12 (stating that Second Circuit precedent from 
before Riley held that search protocols were not mandatory for digital searches, but observing how 
Riley may require a reexamination of that precedent); United States v. Gatson, No. 13-705, 2014 WL 
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stance, on September 29, 2014, in United States v. Lustyik, the District Court for 
the Southern District of New York denied a motion to suppress evidence found 
on the defendant’s cell phone.153 Despite the fact that the warrants failed to in-
clude search protocols and authorized the government to review the entirety of 
the defendant’s smartphone, the court held the warrants did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.154 In an extensive footnote, however, the court discussed the 
implications of Riley on earlier precedent and the future of search protocols.155 
To the court, Riley showed how longstanding criminal procedure precedent, such 
as the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, may have to 
be reevaluated when applied to cell phone searches.156 Moreover, the court stated 
that as people place more and more personal information on cell phones, courts 
may need to mandate search protocols in order to ensure that cell phone search 
warrants comport with the particularity requirement.157 
                                                                                                                           
7182275, at *21 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014) (holding a warrant to search a cell phone, tablet, and computer 
did not need to contain a detailed search protocol to meet the particularity requirement under current 
Third Circuit precedent); United States v. Romain, No. 13 Cr. 724, 2014 WL 6765831, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014) (noting how the Second Circuit had not required search protocols for search-
es of digital media before Riley). 
 153 Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12, *16. The FBI was investigating the defendant’s involve-
ment in a bribery scheme. Id. at *1; see Russ Buettner, Lured by Promises of Wealth, F.B.I. Agent 
Was Drawn into Fraud Scheme, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/
nyregion/lured-by-promises-of-wealth-fbi-agent-was-drawn-into-fraud-scheme-prosecutors-say.html 
[https://perma.cc/manage/vest/8LVJ-LQ8N] (describing how the defendant planned to profit off ar-
raigning military contracts, for which he would receive kickback payments). Earlier in the FBI’s in-
vestigation, the defendants had challenged other warrants for digital searches on particularity grounds 
as well. See Lustyik, 2014 WL 1494019, at *5, *7 (holding cell phone search warrants met the particu-
larity requirement because they noted that only documents relevant to the crime being investigated 
could be seized); John Wesley Hall, D. Utah: No Constitutional Requirement of a Search Protocol in 
an Email Warrant, FOURTHAMENDMENT.COM (Mar. 20, 2014), http://fourthamendment.com/?p=
10562 [http://perma.cc/X2Q9-ARWP] (noting that the court found that the particularity requirement 
did not mandate a search protocol for a cell phone search warrant). 
154 See Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12. The court stated that precedent from the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals firmly established that search protocols were not mandatory for searches of 
digital media. Id; see United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 451 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Ro-
sa, 626 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2010). Therefore, even if it found the particularity requirement mandated 
search protocols for cell phone searches, the court observed that the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule would apply because the FBI had relied on binding appellate precedent when conducting its 
search. Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12. Because the exclusionary rule would not apply, the court 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. See id. 
 155 See Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 n.12. 
156 See id. (discussing how Riley refused to extend U.S. Supreme Court precedent on physical 
searches to digital searches).  
 157 See id. (stating that “threats to privacy posed by digital searches . . . may eventually make 
digital search protocols a Fourth Amendment necessity” (citing Galpin, 720 F.3d at 447 (describing 
how digital search warrants could devolve into general warrants if courts fail to remain diligent in 
applying the particularity requirement))). 
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III. COURTS MUST MANDATE SEARCH PROTOCOLS FOR CELL PHONE 
SEARCH WARRANTS IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT’S PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT 
In order to resolve the differing standards for cell phone search warrants, 
this Part argues that courts must mandate detailed search protocols for cell phone 
search warrants.158 Section A asserts that search protocols are necessary based on 
the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
steadfast protection of the people’s “privacies of life.”159 Section B argues that 
even if appellate courts find that the particularity requirement does not mandate 
search protocols, lower courts should be granted the discretion to impose cell 
phone search protocols when they find them necessary.160 Finally, section C pro-
poses a model for search protocols in cell phone search warrants, listing four 
components that courts should require for such search protocols.161 
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement Mandates Search 
Protocols for Cell Phone Searches 
This section argues that the particularity requirement mandates search 
protocols for cell phone search warrants.162 Subsection 1 explains how search 
protocols for cell phone search warrants are necessary to ensure that Riley truly 
protects the “privacies of life” from general searches.163 Subsection 2 argues 
that longstanding rules on physical searches may be inapplicable to searches of 
digital media, and thus Dalia’s interpretation of the particularity requirement 
should not preclude courts from requiring search protocols.164  
1. Riley v. California Protects the “Privacies of Life” from General 
Searches 
In Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the unique 
threat to privacy that cell phone searches pose and therefore held that the po-
lice must obtain search warrants before searching cell phones.165 The Court 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See infra notes 158–221 and accompanying text. 
 159 See infra notes 162–195 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 196–204 and accompanying text. 
 161 See infra notes 205–221 and accompanying text. 
162 See infra notes 162–195 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 165–183 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 184–195 and accompanying text. 
 165 See Riley v. California (Riley II), 134 S. Ct 2473, 2489 (2014) (stating that “[t]he sum of an 
individual’s private life can be reconstructed” through the data on cell phones in a way inconceivable 
to previous generations); United States v. Lustyik, No. 13-CR-616-VB, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 
n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014); (noting how, after the Riley decision, courts need to recognize the 
threat to privacy digital searches present); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., No. 14–MJ–8005–DJW, 2014 
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affirmed that, in today’s America, cell phones hold “the privacies of life” that 
were stored in homes in past generations.166 Because most smartphone users 
now carry intimate conversations, photographs, and effects in their pockets, the 
Court held that the government must obtain a warrant before searching a per-
son’s cell phone.167 By requiring the police to establish probable cause and 
provide particularized descriptions in order to obtain cell phone search war-
rants, the Court placed essential constitutional limitations on the scope of cell 
phone searches.168  
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected broad warrants for home 
searches, lower courts should reject facially broad cell phone warrants author-
izing the review of the entirety of a cell phone’s data.169 Otherwise, cell phone 
search warrants will authorize the police to indiscriminately review the “priva-
cies of life” modern cell phones often contain.170 In 2014, in Hedgepath v. 
Kentucky, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the validity of such an overly 
broad warrant.171 Although the warrant, on its face, placed no limits on what 
information the police could review, the court inferred that the intended scope 
of the warrant was more narrow.172  
                                                                                                                           
WL 2898262, at *14 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014) (using Riley’s recognition of the threat to privacy posed 
by cell phone searches to require search protocol for cell phone search warrant). 
 166 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
The amount of information stored on cell phones will only increase as Americans move away from tradi-
tional laptops and desktop computers and rely almost entirely on mobile devices for their technological 
needs. See O’Toole, supra note 4 (noting how the majority of Internet usage in the United States oc-
curs through mobile devices); Perez, supra note 4 (observing how many Americans are now consum-
ing digital media on mobile devices rather than personal computers). 
 167 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (discussing the history of general searches and writs of assis-
tance and stating that personal information should retain the same Fourth Amendment protections for 
which the founders fought); Donald Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of 
Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 53 
(2013) (arguing that digital information should be considered “papers” and should be given protection 
superior to “effects” under the Fourth Amendment). 
 168 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (refusing to apply the search incident to arrest exception be-
cause of concerns about the scope of the search); State v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 616, 633 (Neb. 
2014) (reading Riley as attempting to limit the scope of cell phone searches). 
 169 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (comparing the protections cell phones should receive to 
the protections homes receive); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (holding a facially broad 
search warrant for a home violated the particularity requirement); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 
2898262, at *14 (refusing to issue a cell phone search warrant without a detailed search protocol); In 
re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 168 (D.D.C. 2014) (same). 
 170 Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95; see Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (observing how the Fourth Amend-
ment protects against invasions into “the privacies of life”); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 
2898262, at *14 (requiring search protocols for cell phone search warrants to ensure cell phone 
searches do not become general searches); see In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 
(refusing to authorize a search warrant that proposed to examine all the information contained in a cell 
phone). 
171 Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.3d 119, 130–31 (Ky. 2014). 
 172 Id. But see Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633–34 (refusing to read limits into an overly broad cell 
phone search warrant). 
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When dealing with warrants to search homes, however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has rejected similar efforts to infer scope limitations back into facially 
broad warrants.173 In 2004, in Groh v. Ramirez, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a warrant to search a home violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirement because it failed to incorporate the particularized description of a 
home included in the warrant application.174 To the Court, the intended scope 
of the warrant was irrelevant; if the warrant as issued was facially overbroad, 
then it violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.175 If peo-
ple’s most private and intimate of information is to receive the same protec-
tions in the digital age, the same strict standards for home search warrants 
must apply to cell phone search warrants.176 Therefore, courts cannot be per-
mitted to create post hoc limits on the scope of cell phone search warrants.177 
Accordingly, lower courts should follow Judge Waxse’s and Judge Facci-
ola’s interpretation of the particularity requirement and mandate that the gov-
ernment submit technical search protocols for cell phone search warrants.178 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet defined what particularity means 
for cell phones searches, the Fourth Amendment at a minimum requires de-
tailed descriptions of “the place to be searched” and “the persons or things to 
be seized.”179 As Judge Facciola discussed, search protocols address both of 
                                                                                                                           
173 See Groh, 540 U.S. at 557, 559 (holding a search warrant violated the particularity require-
ment, even though the warrant application included a detailed list of the items to be seized, because 
the detailed list was not incorporated into the warrant itself); Stern, supra note 47, at 912 (noting how 
the U.S. Supreme Court has afforded homes the “apex of protection” under the Fourth Amendment). 
 174 See Groh, 540 U.S. at 557, 559. 
175 See id. at 558–59 (recognizing the government’s argument that “the search did not exceed the 
limits intended by the Magistrate” but still holding the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement because it placed no explicit limits on the search’s scope). 
176 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (noting how cell phones contain the people’s most private 
information and providing full Fourth Amendment protection to such sensitive information); Groh, 
540 U.S. at 559 (observing that homes receive the highest level of protection under the Fourth 
Amendment); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14 (requiring a search protocol for a 
cell phone search warrant in order to protect the deeply personal information stored on cell phones 
from general searches); In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168–69 (denying the govern-
ment’s warrant application because it failed to articulate necessary scope limitations on the search). 
177 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (affording cell phones the same warrant protections given 
to homes); Groh, 540 U.S. at 557, 559 (refusing to infer scope limits into a search warrant for a 
home). But see Hedgepath, 441 S.W.3d at 130 (upholding a facially broad warrant authorizing a cell 
phone search because the “clear thrust” of the warrant was more limited in scope). 
 178 See In re Cellular Tels., No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 
2014); In re Search of Premises Known as Three Cellphones & One Micro-SD Card, No. L4-MJ-
8013-DJW, 2014 WL 3845157, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 4, 2014); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 
2898262, at *14; In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 166; In re Search of ODYS LOOX 
Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415 in Custody of U.S. Postal Inspection Serv., 1400 New York 
Ave. NW, Wash., D.C., 28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 46 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 
78 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 179 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (requiring a warrant for cell phone 
searches but not mentioning how probable cause and particularity should be applied); In re Nextel 
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these particularity concerns.180 First, because it is impossible at a search’s out-
set to identify the exact part of a cell phone’s internal storage containing rele-
vant data, search protocols provide a particularized description of how the 
government will identify the place on the phone to be searched.181 Second, 
search protocols provide particularized descriptions of the information to be 
seized by setting forth guidelines for identifying the data the government 
seeks.182 Unless lower courts demand such detailed search protocols, cell 
phone search warrants will authorize broad, unfettered searches, thereby di-
minishing the reinvigorated protections Riley sought to give the “privacies of 
life” in the modern digital world.183 
2. Dalia Strikes an Unfair Balance When Applied to Cell Phone Searches 
Riley demonstrates that well-established Fourth Amendment rules govern-
ing physical searches may be inapplicable to digital searches; therefore lower 
courts should disregard earlier precedent holding that particularity does not 
limit how the police execute warrants.184 Although the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement had been recognized for centuries, the 
Riley court unanimously refused to apply it to cell phone searches.185 Because 
                                                                                                                           
Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *4, *6 (observing that neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the 
Tenth Circuit had yet to explain what probable cause and particularity mean when applied to cell 
phone search warrants); Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633–34 (stating that “[t]he parameters of how 
specific the scope of a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone must be will surely develop in the 
wake of Riley v. California”). 
 180 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167; In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 
1171 (Vt. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 185 (2013). 
 181 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167; In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 
1171 (stating that “the only feasible way to specify a particular ‘region’ of the computer will be by 
specifying how to search”). 
 182 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *12 (stating that “sufficiently specific 
guidelines for identifying the documents sought” must accompany search warrant application (quoting 
United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982))). 
 183 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (stating that the Court must protect the “privacies of life” 
cell phones contain from general searches); Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 n.12 (recognizing that 
search protocols may become necessary to ensure the Fourth Amendment remains relevant in digital 
searches); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14 (interpreting Riley to mandate search 
protocols for cell phone search warrants); Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633 (finding a warrant violated 
the particularity requirement and leaving open the question of whether search protocols should be 
mandatory to comport with Riley). 
 184 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (concluding that the search incident to arrest exception does 
not strike the proper balance between privacy and government interests for cell phone searches); Unit-
ed States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding a warrantless search of a cigarette pack 
found on the arrestee’s body during a search incident to arrest was reasonable); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (recognizing “the right on the part of the Government, always recog-
nized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to 
discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime”). 
 185 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2482, 2485 (quoting Weeks’s observation of the historic right to 
search an arrestee incident to arrest but declining to apply the search incident to arrest exception to 
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the Court found one of the fundamental Fourth Amendment principles govern-
ing physical searches inapplicable to digital searches, lower courts should 
pause before applying interpretations of the particularity requirement from 
physical searches to digital searches.186 
Earlier views of the particularity requirement provide inadequate privacy 
protections when applied to cell phone search warrants.187 In 1979, in Dalia v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the particularity requirement 
did not limit how the police chose to execute a search warrant for the defend-
ant’s office.188 But, in light of the Court’s recognition in Riley that longstand-
ing Fourth Amendment precedent may not apply to cell phone searches, some 
lower courts have refused to read the particularity requirement so narrowly.189 
Before applying Dalia’s view of the particularity requirement to cell 
phone search warrants, judges should critically examine the balance struck in 
such earlier cases between the government’s need to investigate crime and the 
people’s right of privacy.190 When U.S. District Court Magistrate Judges Fac-
ciola and Waxse considered this balance, they found that rigidly applying tradi-
tional views of the particularity requirement would unfairly favor the govern-
ment at the expense of individual privacy.191 Although limits on the police’s 
discretion in executing warrants were not necessary for searches of physical 
spaces, such limitations are necessary to ensure that searches of digital media 
do not devolve into general rummaging.192 
                                                                                                                           
cell phone searches); id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring) (characterizing the search incident to arrest 
exception as an “ancient rule”). 
 186 See id. at 2484 (majority opinion) (stating the search incident to arrest exception provides 
inadequate privacy protections when applied to searches of digital media on cell phones). 
 187 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (refusing to apply a rule on physical searches to digital search-
es because of privacy concerns); United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006); Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979); see also In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167 (hold-
ing Dalia does not preclude courts from interpreting the particularity requirement to mandate search 
protocols). 
 188 See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257 (holding that covert entry to execute the warrant was within the 
police’s discretion and the warrant did not violate the particularity requirement for failing to authorize 
covert entry). The Court reaffirmed this view of the particularity requirement in 2006 in United States 
v. Grubbs. See 547 U.S. at 97–98 (relying on Dalia’s interpretation of the particularity requirement to 
find anticipatory warrants constitutional). 
 189 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (refusing to apply the search incident arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement to cell phone searches); In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *6; In re 
Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167. 
 190 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (stating that “while Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the 
appropriate balance in the context of physical objects, neither of its rationales has much force with 
respect to digital content on cell phones”); In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *6; In re Apple 
iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167. 
 191 See In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *3, *4; In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 
F. Supp. 3d at 167. 
 192 See In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *8; In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 
F. Supp. 3d at 167. Despite Judge Facciola’s attempts to find that search protocols do not limit how 
the police execute warrants, search protocols are limitations on how the police may search a device. 
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With Dalia inapplicable to cell phone search warrants, courts should 
mandate limitations on the police’s power to execute cell phone search war-
rants by requiring search protocols.193 As the Kentucky Supreme Court demon-
strated in Hedgepath, when courts do not require search protocols, the gov-
ernment will conduct exhaustive and unlimited reviews of every document 
contained in seized cell phones.194 By requiring the government to submit de-
tailed search protocols explaining the methods it will use to find relevant data, 
courts will ensure that the Fourth Amendment’s protections remain in full ef-
fect in the digital age.195 
B. Courts Should Allow Magistrate Judges to Require Search Protocols 
Even if appellate courts find that the particularity requirement does not 
mandate search protocols for cell phone search warrants, lower courts must 
have the power to impose search protocols when necessary.196 A bright-line 
rule requiring search protocols would provide clearer guidelines to the police 
                                                                                                                           
Compare In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167 (holding Dalia does not preclude courts 
from interpreting the particularity requirement to mandate search protocols), with Friess, supra note 
46, at 1015 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)) (stating that search protocols 
do limit the police’s discretion, but that judges possess the power to limit the police’s discretion in this 
way). As discussed above, however, these limitations on police discretion are necessary to provide a 
particularized scope to cell phone searches. See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14 
(stating that without a search protocol, the court would authorize a general search of the defendant’s 
cell phone in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Friess, supra note 46, at 1015 (noting how judges 
have a duty to limit the scope of digital search warrants to ensure they comply with the particularity 
requirement). 
 193 See In re Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *1; In re Search of Premises Known as Three 
Cellphones, 2014 WL 3845157, at *2; In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *14; In re 
Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168; In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 
4707213703415, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 46. 
 194 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (noting how the government’s pro-
posed search protocol would authorize the government to examine all the information contained in the 
device); Hedgepath, 441 S.W.3d at 130–31 (upholding a warrant that authorized search and seizure of 
all data contained in phone). Even in United States v. Lustyik, where the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York recognized the potential need for search protocols, the court still upheld an unlim-
ited search of all the information contained in the defendant’s cell phone. See Lustyik, 2014 WL 
4802911, at *12. 
 195 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *12; In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 
F. Supp. 3d at 167–68. 
 196 See Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 n.12 (recognizing that search protocols for cell phone 
warrants may become necessary in certain circumstances to protect against general searches); Hender-
son, 854 N.W.2d at 633–34 (considering the need for search protocols but not yet mandating them for 
cell phone search warrants); see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 
1162, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (stating that the warrant application 
for computer search warrants “should normally include, or the issuing judicial officer should insert, a 
protocol for preventing agents involved in the investigation from examining or retaining any data 
other than that for which probable cause is shown”); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1171 (allowing 
judges to impose search protocols on computer searches but not finding search protocols constitution-
ally mandatory). 
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and would be easier for courts to enforce.197 But, if an appellate court is un-
comfortable with articulating rigid procedures beyond the plain language of 
the Fourth Amendment, it can simply defer to the judge issuing the search war-
rant.198 As the person first evaluating the warrant application and the facts of 
the case, the issuing judge is in the best position to determine what limits are 
needed to ensure a particularized search.199 If the issuing judge finds a search 
protocol necessary to limit the cell phone search warrant’s scope, a reviewing 
court should support the judge’s evaluation of the warrant application.200 
 Appellate courts could also follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach in 
Dalia and declare that search protocols are the “preferable approach” for cell 
phone search warrants.201 In Dalia, the Court found that although the particu-
larity requirement did not mandate that the government obtain prior authoriza-
tion before covertly installing a listening device, prior authorization was still 
the “preferable approach.”202 The Court recognized that covert entries further 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (stating that, when interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court’s “general preference [is] to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical 
rules”); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981) (noting that “if police are to have work-
able rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . must in large part be done on a categorical 
basis”); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *12; In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 
F. Supp. 3d at 168. 
 198 See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97–98; Dalia, 441 U.S. at 258 n.22; Comprehensive Drug Testing, 
Inc., 621 F.3d at 1177 (allowing judges to impose search protocols for computer searches but not 
mandating them); id. at 1179 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (encouraging lower courts to use search 
protocols for computer searches); Henderson, 854 N.W.2d at 633–34 (leaving the question to lower 
courts of whether to mandate search protocols for cell phone searches); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 
at 1171 (upholding the lower court’s power to impose a search protocol for a computer search). Alt-
hough the U.S. Supreme Court in Riley recognized that rules on physical searches may not apply fair-
ly to digital searches, lower courts may hesitate revisiting the longstanding view that the particularity 
requirement does not limit how the police may execute warrants. See Riley II, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 
(holding that the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phone searches); Grubbs, 
547 U.S. at 97–98 (reading the Fourth Amendment’s particularity clause very narrowly); Dalia, 441 
U.S. at 258 (holding that the particularity requirement does not limit how the police execute warrants); 
Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 (reading Dalia to find the particularity requirement does not man-
date search protocols for cell phone searches). Furthermore, the Court has resisted reading technical 
procedures into the particularity requirement. See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 99 (holding that anticipatory 
warrants did not violate the particularity requirement); Dalia, 441 U.S. at 258 (refusing to find that the 
particularity requirement mandated prior authorization for covert entries to execute search warrants). 
199 See Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1179 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the power the issuing judge possesses to limit search methods based on the privacy interests at 
stake in the search); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1184 (finding that issuing judges have the pow-
er to place limits on the government’s search of a computer). 
200 See Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1177 (upholding the power of lower courts 
to impose search protocols in digital searches); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1184 (same). 
 201 See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 259 n.22 (stating prior authorization for covert entry to install a recording 
device is the “preferable approach); Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1179 (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring) (stating that computer search warrants “should normally include” search protocols); Lustyik, 
2014 WL 4802911, at *12 n.12 (recognizing the growing need in digital searches for protections like 
search protocols). 
202 Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257, 259 n.22. 
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impinge upon a defendant’s privacy and therefore the government, as a policy 
matter, should seek judicial approval before utilizing this search method.203 In 
the same way, appellate courts could express a preference for search protocols 
while sidestepping the potentially contentious issue of whether search proto-
cols are mandatory under the particularity requirement.204  
C. A Model for Search Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants 
Courts should follow Judge Facciola’s approach for search protocols in 
cell phone search warrants and demand a list of the exact methods and tools 
the government will use both to set the scope of the search and to execute the 
search.205 As such, this section makes four recommendations for cell phone 
search protocols to comply with the particularity requirement.206  
First, if the government wishes to “image” a cell phone, a process by 
which the government makes a complete digital copy of the device’s contents, 
it should be required to explain why imaging is necessary and how it will han-
dle information not relevant to its investigation copied in the image.207 Imaging 
is a commonly used tool in digital searches and may often be an essential first 
step in an in-depth forensic review.208 But because the technique is inherently 
overbroad, the government must justify its use in each case and explain how it 
                                                                                                                           
203 See id. (noting how covert entry may impinge on privacy interests “not explicitly considered 
by the judge who issued the warrant” and therefore expressing a preference for prior authorization). 
204 See id. at 259 n.22; Lustyik, 2014 WL 4802911, at *12 n.12 (discussing the constitutional 
questions surrounding mandatory search protocols for cell phone search warrants); Friess, supra note 
46, at 1015 (recommending that courts rely on Dalia to find that search protocols for digital search 
warrants are the “preferable approach”(quoting Dalia, 441 U.S. at 259 n.22)). 
 205 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *13 (stating that a cell phone search pro-
tocol “educates (1) the Court as to what the government is doing when it searches a cell, and (2) the 
executing officer as to what places and things may or may not be searched and/or seized”); In re 
Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (stating that cell phone search protocols should be “a 
sophisticated technical explanation of how the government intends to conduct the search”); see also In 
re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1162, 1184 (upholding a search protocol for a computer search warrant 
that prevented the police from using specific search tools without prior judicial approval). 
206 See infra notes 207–221 and accompanying text. 
 207 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 166 (requiring that the government delete 
any data beyond the investigation’s scope from the image it created of the cell phone); In re Search of 
ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 45 (rejecting a proposed 
search protocol that sought to image all seized devices because imaging would allow the government 
to search and seize data beyond the scope of its investigation); In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 
F. Supp. 3d at 79–80 (expressing concern over whether all of the seized cell phones would be imaged 
and, if so, whether the government planned to keep such images indefinitely). 
 208 See Goldfoot, supra note 57, at 115–16 (describing imaging as a commonly used search tech-
nique that allows the government to review data at off-site locations); Kerr, supra note 61, at 540 
(stating that the first step in nearly all forensic computer searches is imaging the device). 
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will avoid viewing and retaining information beyond the investigation’s 
scope.209 
Second, cell phone search protocols should include a list of the keywords 
the government will use in its keyword search.210 Keyword searches narrow the 
scope of a search to files containing specific terms, making them a helpful but 
blunt search tool.211 Despite their limitations, police commonly use keyword 
searches, at least as a starting point for a search.212 By requiring a list of key-
words in search protocols, courts can place common sense and nontechnical par-
ticularity limitations on at least one aspect of the government’s search.213 
Third, search protocols should list the software the government will use to 
search the phone.214 Because the government uses software to automatically 
perform many aspects of the digital search, courts must know what software 
the government plans to use in order to ensure that the search is limited in 
scope.215 The government can submit a search protocol that authorizes all of 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *10 (denying a cell phone search warrant 
because the application failed to specify whether the government would or would not use imaging); In 
re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 166 (stating that the court would not approve the warrant 
until the government made clear whether it would image the seized cell phones and, if so, whether it 
would delete irrelevant information from the produced image); Kerr, supra note 61, at 562 (noting 
how imaging can result in overbroad seizures of computer files). 
 210 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *12 & n.92 (observing that the govern-
ment’s proposal to “perform [] keyword searches” without further explanation “may pose problems” 
(alteration in original)); In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (noting how the warrant 
application stated that the government may employ “keyword searches for related terms”); Haynes, 
supra note 66, at 771–72 (describing keyword searches as a “particularly useful method” for digital 
searches). 
 211 See COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 68, at 79 (noting that forensic investigators may start with 
keyword searches, “but a properly performed forensic analysis will rarely end there” because keyword 
searches often miss relevant information); Goldfoot, supra note 57, at 138 (noting how keyword 
searches can be “imperfect” because they can fail to “catch unanticipated wording, an egregious mis-
spelling, an unexpected foreign language, recently invented slang, or pictures of documents”); 
Haynes, supra note 66, at 771–72. 
 212 COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 68, at 79; Haynes, supra note 66, at 771–72. 
 213 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *12 (discussing how the government’s 
warrant application failed to provide adequate detail on how it planned to use keyword searches); In re 
Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (seeking more detail on how the government would 
execute keyword searches); Haynes, supra note 66, at 771–72 (observing how keyword searches easi-
ly allow the police to conduct a precise digital search with a narrow scope). 
 214 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (stating that the government should 
explain what software it will use and how it plans to use that software to search the cell phone); In re 
Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1162, 1184 (upholding a search protocol that required the police to re-
ceive judicial approval before using specific software). 
 215 See Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1176 (recognizing how “specialized foren-
sic software” allows police to determine the contents of digital files); In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 
F. Supp. 3d at 168 (stating that the government should explain what software it will use so that the 
court can evaluate whether the government’s search is particularized); Kerr, supra note 61, at 544–45 
(describing how computer forensic analysts can use software to automatically bring together certain 
file types for examination). 
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the software the government usually uses in such searches.216 If, however, the 
government decides it needs to use software not previously authorized in its 
search protocol, it can simply ask the court for permission to use these new 
techniques.217 
Finally, in cases where imaging is used, search protocols should set a spe-
cific date by which the image must be permanently destroyed.218 These images 
must be deleted because the government cannot be permitted to retain indefinite-
ly information beyond the investigation’s scope.219 As Judge Facciola discussed 
in In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial Number 4704213703415, sub-
sequent testimony can address any chain of custody or other evidentiary con-
cerns.220 This testimony can explain that the device’s image is a complete record 
of all relevant files contained on the device and all files beyond the investiga-
tion’s scope were deleted to comply with a court order.221 
CONCLUSION 
In 2014, in Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that in 
today’s America, cell phones contain the “privacies of life” and therefore re-
                                                                                                                           
 216 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (explaining that the government can 
use whatever software or other search methods it believes it needs to conduct its investigation, so long 
as it demonstrates to the court that it is “making a genuine effort to limit itself to a particularized 
search”); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1162, 1184 (noting that the government can present the 
software it wishes to use so that the judge can make an informed judgment as to whether such soft-
ware is necessary for a search). 
 217 See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168; In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 
1162, 1184 (stating that judges can be quickly respond to government requests for additional search-
ing tools as the investigation proceeds). 
 218 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *10 (finding the government’s failure to 
propose a specific date by which the device’s image would be destroyed “fatal” to its warrant applica-
tion); In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 45–46 
(denying the government’s request to retain cell phone’s image “indefinitely pending appeal”); see 
also In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1185 (upholding a warrant that banned the indefinite storage of 
all digital information from the seized device during the defendant’s appeals). 
 219 See In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *11 (finding that the government must 
explicitly state the date by which it will destroy or return irrelevant data in order to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment); In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 
F. Supp. 3d at 45 (stating that if the court failed to require a specific date by which all irrelevant data 
must be destroyed, it would “allow the government to maintain data that it—and this Court—knows to 
be outside the scope of the warrant”); see also In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1185 (upholding a 
lower court’s requirement that all irrelevant data be destroyed). 
220 In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 46 
(noting how testimony explaining the search protocol’s requirements would allay the government’s 
concern over future chain of custody problems); see also In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 
2898262, at *8 (discussing Judge Facciola’s solution to potential chain of custody problem). 
 221 In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet Serial No. 4707213703415, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 46 
(describing the potential testimony that could explain why the device’s image is not complete); see 
also In re Nextel Cellular Tel., 2014 WL 2898262, at *8 (recounting Judge Facciola’s discussion of 
testimony regarding incomplete device images). 
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quired the police to obtain warrants before searching cell phones. But in order 
to ensure cell phone searches do not devolve into generalized rummaging in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, lower courts must require search protocols 
when issuing cell phone search warrants. Without search protocols, cell phone 
search warrants will violate the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, 
for they will fail to set any limitations on where the police can search within 
the device and what information the police can seize from the device. Although 
earlier precedent interpreting the particularity requirement in physical searches 
may preclude mandatory search protocols, lower courts should follow Riley 
and recognize that rules and interpretations for physical searches may not ap-
ply to digital searches. The people’s “privacies of life” deserve the highest pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment. Only detailed search protocols will pro-
vide such protection to the trove of intimate information stored on cell phones. 
WILLIAM CLARK 
